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Abstract 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the consequences of contradicting values in the 
treaty base that define the principles of the European Union. This investigation is build 
up around the concepts of Legitimacy, Political Myths and Court Case rulings.  
The theoretical frame that the thesis relies on, connect three Political Myths to the 
Legitimacy of the EU, and to the consistency and rulings in court cases ruled by the 
European Court of Justice. The three Political Myths that the theory describes are the 
myth about the social rights of the EU, the myth about the economic governance by the 
EU, and the myth about the environmental responsibility of the EU. 
The main research is to investigate whether the legitimacy of the EU changes if the 
European Court of Justice favors one political myth in its rulings. 
The conclusions to the investigation are that there also exists a 4
th
 political myth, that 
concern democracy and the rule of law in the EU, that the EU consistently favors 
fundamental rights over a free economy, and that political myths determine which 
actions are available to decision makers. 
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1 Myths in Politics 
For the past hundred years, there has been a steep increase in the number of 
international organization that act as mediators and observers in international politics, a 
trend that started with the now extinct League of Nations that was formed in 1920 
during the aftermath of the First World War. These international organizations have 
however not always been that good at uniting the world. There were after all a Second 
World War ending the League of Nations while its successor the United Nations has 
also proven to be inefficient at preventing certain kinds of conflict such as the Bush led 
war in Iraq and disputes between Israel and Palestine. One aspect of the UN's 
inefficiency can be seen in both the internal disputes in the leading organs, such as the 
Security Council, and the lack of consequence for breaking the rules of the UN. What 
the UN is in a lack off, the EU has however gained more or less successfully. When 
viewing the EU as an international institution, then the EU easily represents the most 
intense supranational project short of creating an actual federation, and it would be more 
accurate to call the EU an intergovernmental institution rather than an international one. 
The most important divider between the UN and the EU in their internal make up is that 
in order to become a part of the EU a state gives up some sovereignty and become 
subject to the Law of the EU as described in its primary legislative texts, the EU 
Treaties. The act of signing the EU Treaties gives legitimacy and vigour to the EU on a 
so far unsurpassed level and draws associations to the term 'social contract' (Locke, 
1689). Going further with the nation state associations, the EU is using nation building 
politics to gain further legitimacy to keep its rule. 
The concept of nation building outside of the state is a novel one considering the scope 
of regionalisation. Whereas most regionalisation processes has a clear goal of 
facilitating trade and being a bulwark against global economy the EU has gone more 
than one step further.  
The EU has established its legitimacy first as an economic necessity and secondly as an 
agent of post-war reconciliation. However, the European economy is faltering and 
younger generations cannot remember the horrors of the War. This calls for a new 
round of nation building and re-branding of the EU to maintain its legitimacy. 
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Recently the EU has stepped into at least three different crises that can ultimately either 
prove that the EU is too impotent to take action or to gain further legitimacy by showing 
its dedication to problem solving. At the same time, the EU can prove that some 
problems are best solved at a regional level or intergovernmental level, thus giving the 
EU a reason to exist.  
The EU has involved itself on the international stage of climate control as a key player 
in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This ties 
the success of climate negotiations at COP meetings with the climate profile of the EU, 
thus presenting climate cooperation as an area best negotiated through a regional 
negotiator, if the COP leads to a successful result. The climate politics is an area that the 
EU has willingly invested political will in, while the other areas of current crisis are not.  
The economic recession and the poor economy of southern Europe has become a make 
it or break it for the future of EU economic integration. Germany has through the EU set 
as a demand that the Greek economy be set under economic surveillance by the EU, if 
they are to continue as part of the Eurozone, and to gain monetary support from EU 
Member States, while plans for a permanent bail-out fund for the Eurozone states are 
being discussed.
 12
 The current economic crisis handling brings new facets to the future 
of the EU and its position as a regional protection against the global economy. The 
crisis will however only let the EU gain legitimacy if there is a popular consent that the 
EU does a good job.  
The EU has become the key actor in the protection of privacy on the internet or the 
protection of intellectual property in a current court case in the EU system. The Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) that the EU helped negotiate with et al. USA 
and Canada, were recently referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as a result of 
continent wide protests that ACTA is in violation of the rights of privacy.
 3
 Depending 
on whether the ECJ overrule or support the trade agreement then the EU has gained the 
possibility to prove that it support fundamental rights over the more economic right of 
intellectual property. 
                                                          
1
 http://euobserver.com/19/115058 accessed 30/01/2012 
2
 http://euobserver.com/19/114992 accessed 24/01/2012 
3
 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/acta/ accessed 14/03/2012 
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The last current crisis is with the new Hungarian constitution that went into force on 
January 1
st
 2011. Due to a number of authoritarian tendencies in the Hungarian 
constitution, such as a state controlled Central Bank and government control of the 
media, the EU has historically sued a Member State to be reviewed by the ECJ 
(IP/12/24). On a previous occasion where a Member State was suspected of being in 
violation of EU, values were in 2000 where EU Member States conducted political 
sanctions against Austria in objection to the inclusion of the right wing politician Jörg 
Heider as part of the Austrian government. The core of this is that the official channels 
and proceedings for the EU to enforce its values upon its constituency are being tested. 
Once again, this is an opportunity for the EU to finally prove that it has the capability to 
protect the values that it endorses.  
The reason to bring up the above four examples, are that they build on political myths 
about the EU. One way for the EU to overcome legitimacy problems are by creating 
self-sustaining myths that create reasons for the EU to exist and authority to its rule 
(Lenschow and Sprungk 2010: 136). This formulation sidesteps the issue of whether 
there is an ultimate reason for the EU to exist that it needs legitimacy to sustain, or if the 
EU as an institution has become intent on keeping itself alive just for the purpose of 
keeping itself alive. Regardless of this conundrum, the political myths of the EU need to 
be maintained through trial. The four current crises that the EU is involved in is a good 
example of some very prominent myths that the EU has created about itself. An 
environmental myth, an economic myth, and a social rights myth.  
The political myths of the EU is founded on, and has founded, the values of the EU as 
they appear in the treaty base, and has become so enmeshed with the Union that to deny 
one aspect is to deny the whole Union. The very practical and functionally based myths 
of the EU need to be uphold however, and that creates a problem when a situation occur 
where the myths and their corresponding values and legislative base is in opposition to 
one another. The inconsistency of European values is in itself a subject of scholarly 
scrutiny (et al. Manners 2002: 242, Diez 2005: 619-620, Sjursen 2006: 170). This 
inconsistency also has consequences outside the theoretical world as it has a real impact 
in the legal framework of the EU, as a central part of its primary law. Since the creation 
of the ECJ, the court has at numerous occasions shown an active involvement in 
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creating standards and shifting power through the interpretation of vague legislation 
(Micklitz, 2010: 31 and Neergaard & Nielsen, 2011: 108).  
With a lack of articulation of key concepts as well as contradicting values within the 
EU, it is up to the ECJ to decide both the meaning and weight of the Economic, 
Environmental, and Social aspects of the EU identity. With the Judicial activism of the 
ECJ in mind, then it should be possible to get a more clear picture of which of the three 
European Myths, and thereby which European values, if any, the EU in general and the 
ECJ in particular favour, by reviewing court cases with contradicting values that has 
been before the ECJ.  
The reason why it is important to know on which grounds the ECJ rule, and in which 
direction it is steering the EU, is that it can be traced back to political myths and thereby 
to the legitimacy of the EU. The European court system combined with the treaties is 
the prime carriers of European identity and myth creation (Williams, 2010: 10, 18). 
When the court rule, it is a final expression of what the Union wants and with the high 
level ambiguity and framework legislation in the treaties and judicial activism and 
support in the courts, it is the courts that make the finer distinctions in how the EU 
work. If it can be established how powerful, the three EU myths are in relation to each 
other in the court it will give an idea of which direction the EU is going, and in which 
areas it gains a legitimate voice in global and local politics. As an example, it would be 
easier for the EU to demand that its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) partners 
have low levels of corruption, if the EU also cracked down hard on corruption within its 
own borders. It should also be noted that a mixed signal from the courts with no clear 
sense of direction for the EU, would undermine the EU's overall legitimacy, as it would 
appear to not really want anything at all (Williams, 2010: 18).  
Taking a further step back to the world of International Organizations, then the same 
ideas can be applied to for example the UN. If the lesson from the EU is that, you need 
coherent rulings and to practice what you preach, then it is no wonder that an 
International Organization that has given the right of veto to the people with the biggest 
gun, do not have the legitimacy to promote world peace. 
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1.1 Thesis Question 
The ontology of this dissertation is a narrative that link different theories together. The 
narrative links the field of legitimacy with the field of political myth, which is then 
linked to the institutional ethos of the ECJ. This narrative can be formulated into a 
thesis question in order to more easily render the ontology ready for research: 
 
How do ECJ rulings, in cases with contradicting EU Values, affect the EU's gain of 
legitimacy through its political myths? 
 
The thesis question follows a classic schematic of problem oriented project work (Olsen 
& Pedersen, 2003: 36). It consists of two parts and the relation between them. Here the 
rulings of the ECJ and the EU's legitimacy are set in relation to each other through the 
political myths of the EU. Going further with the basic observations of the thesis 
question, then the thesis question can be understood as an investigation of why the EU 
has more political legitimacy than other supra national organizations, despite the 
paradox that its numerous focus areas is contradicting. These observations will be 
explored further in the chapter on methodical consideration.  
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2 How this Thesis fit Together 
In this section, I will discuss how the different parts of this thesis fit together. First off, I 
would like to let the structure of the project follow the same lines as the problem area 
and thesis question in the main body of text. This means that the project will start with a 
theoretical discussion that connects legitimacy with ECJ court cases via political myths. 
Subsequently that theoretical narrative will then be retraced empirically by first 
investigating how court cases constitute political myths, and then investigate if the ECJ 
has the legitimacy to rule in the areas of the political myths of the EU. 
This structure starts in the chapter: What is the EU? And what does it do? With a 
discussion on why the EU needs a strong political identity to generate legitimacy, while 
a classical nation state can build its identity on its history and creationist myth. The 
outcome of this discussion is that the EU needs to create a strong positive identity 
through political myths. This discussion will continue in the following chapter: The 
Political Myths of the EU, where the concept of political myths will be explored. This 
chapter will discuss the theoretical foundation for the existence of three selected major 
myths of the EU, an Economic myth, am Environmental myth and a Social myth. Based 
on the discussion of those three myths, the next chapter: The Principle Values of 
Europe, will explore how those myths correspond with the treaty base of the EU. The 
chapter starts with a historical evaluation of how values has evolved in the EU, followed 
by an assessment of which there are stated values that correspond to the three selected 
political myths of the EU. These findings will then be used as the basis for which court 
cases that should be examined in the chapter: Going to Court. This chapter will analyse 
those court cases that refer to values in the Lisbon treaty and is part of one of the three 
selected political myths. The goal of this analysis is to determine if the ECJ argue 
coherently, and if it favours any given set of values corresponding to a political myth. 
The final chapter of the main body of text: What the EU is. And what it can do, retrace 
the findings of the previous chapter and discuss how this correspond with the hypothesis 
that the strength of the Political Myths of the EU are based on how the ECJ rule, and the 
hypothesis that the strength of the EU's political Myths affect the Legitimacy and room 
to manoeuvre for the EU. In table, 2.1 below there is a compilation of the goals of the 
chapters that make up the main body of text in this thesis.  
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Table 2.1 – Project Design 
Chapter Goal of the chapter Relation to previous 
chapter(s) 
4 What is the EU? 
And what does it do? 
Finding the link from legitimacy 
to Political Myths. 
 
5 The Political Myths 
of the EU 
Providing background 
knowledge on how political 
myths function and is sustained. 
Establishing the essence of three 
major political myths. 
 
6 The Principle 
Values of  Europe 
Finding which Values in the 
Articles of the Lisbon Treaty, 
that corresponds to Political 
Myths of the EU.  
The articles to be selected are 
based on the findings of The 
Political Myths of the EU 
7 Going to Court  Finding how coherent the ECJ is 
in its rulings on EU values and 
if there are any set of values 
based on EU Political Myths 
that are favoured above other 
sets of values based on EU 
Political Myths. 
The selected court cases are 
based on the found Articles 
in The Political Myths of the 
EU, and the framework for 
discussing which sets of 
values are favoured is based 
on The Principle Values of  
Europe 
8 What the EU is. And 
what it can do 
Determining which political 
areas, the EU has the legitimacy 
to rule in, and if this correspond 
with the constellation of 
strength in political myths that 
the ECJ has constituted. 
The basis for the discussion 
in this chapter, are the 
conclusion of the Going to 
Court and the link between 
legitimacy and political 
myths found in What is the 
EU? And what does it do? 
 
Before the main body of text, there are, however, some methodical considerations on 
how it even makes sense to create the narrative of this thesis from a social science point 
of view. 
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3 What, Why and How to Research  
The following chapter has as its purpose to discuss what this thesis is researching, why 
it makes sense to research it, and how it is researched. First, the thesis statement is made 
more operational by reformulating it into two hypotheses that can then later be tested. 
Second, there is a discussion of why the thesis is best researched by a framework based 
on the critical realism science theory. Third and last, there is a discussion of the research 
strategy employed in the different analysis chapters. 
3.1 Hypothesis Development 
The discussion starts with the overall goal for this thesis, the thesis statement. This 
thesis has taken political myths and put that concept at the centre of research, and 
subsequently built a theoretical framework around that concept. The theoretical 
framework consists of the link between legitimacy and political myths (Lenschow and 
Sprungk 2010: 136) and the link between political myths and how coherent the ECJ rule 
(Micklitz, 2010: 31 and Neergaard & Nielsen, 2011: 108). The goal of this thesis is then 
to empirically investigate if there is link between how the ECJ rule, and the legitimacy 
of the EU. 
This theoretical framework need to be understood while considering the judicial 
activism of the ECJ (Roseberry, 2010: 225), that enable the court to actively pursue 
what it believe is the most appropriate direction for the EU. This thesis first investigates 
which direction this is, and subsequently understands how much effect the choices of 
the ECJ have on the legitimacy of the larger EU perspective. This gives rise to two 
hypotheses. One that test the theoretical construction that leads from the overall identity 
problems in the EU Treaty text , through the Political myths of the EU and into specific 
EU court cases. In other words, it will prove that the values of the EU are contradicting 
when brought down to a practical level. And another hypothesis that determines if the 
rulings of the ECJ has an effect on the legitimacy of the EU. 
The first hypothesis is founded in a deductive frame where existing theories are first 
linked together and then tested afterwards. The hypothesis is that the ECJ establish a 
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hierarchy between political myths about the EU when it makes rulings in cases where 
political myths are contradicting. In other words the first hypothesis is,  
...to prove that the ECJ partly establish the political myths of the EU through court 
cases.  
The way to test this hypothesis is by examining if the ECJ take a stance, explicitly or 
through argumentation in court cases, that steers the EU in a distinct direction.  
The other hypothesis is more inductive in nature and has as its starting point the 
findings of the first hypothesis. The goal is to find out if the rulings of the ECJ actually 
have an impact in the possibilities for the EU to act as trustworthy policy carrier. The 
theoretical frame behind this is that the EU should gain more legitimacy, and thus 
political strength, in areas that it commits itself and its constituency to. The ECJ should 
provide this legitimacy the court is coherent in its rulings. In other words the second 
hypothesis is, 
...to prove that there is coherency between ECJ rulings and the legitimacy of the EU. 
Depending on the findings in the first hypothesis, there is two ways to research this. 
Either the first hypothesis result in the ECJ being coherent in its rulings, which means 
that I need to prove that the EU has increased legitimacy in those policy areas affected. 
Alternately the EU is incoherent in its rulings, which would mean that I need to prove 
that the EU loses legitimacy i.e. support to rule in the given area. 
The greatest weakness is the second hypothesis. Unless there is an explicit reference to 
the coherency of ECJ rulings (which is more likely to happen if it is not there) then it is 
hard to prove that it is the ECJ rulings that are the source of EU legitimacy. Therefore, 
ECJ rulings must be allowed as implicit carriers of legitimacy, if it can be proved that 
the ECJ strengthen a political myth and that myth then help the EU to gain legitimacy. 
Normally the choice of empirical data should also be included as a matter of discussion 
in a chapter on methodology, but the selection of empirical data has become a subject of 
analysis itself in chapter 6. There are however the choices of how to choose the 
empirical data in chapter 6.  
These choices are the use of court cases to investigate which values the EU court prefer 
and steer the EU towards, and the use of the primary Treaties base to find out which 
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court cases to analyse. The choice of court cases over other venues of empirical 
knowledge, such as interviews with judges or publicly stated intents by judiciary 
officials, are that court cases constitute a direct link from intent to action, in which any 
political will to influence a ruling will become visible as a part of the judiciary intent 
and action itself. With official statements and interviews, there might be political 
pressure to say one thing and do another or to state a vision rather than what is 
applicable in reality. Another reason for using the court case rulings over judge 
interviews are the availability of knowledge provided. While court cases provide a 
limited but sufficient available amount of data, an interview would require someone that 
wanted to talk and elaborate, while a judge would already have said what he or she 
wanted to say about a court case, in the actual court case. 
Another way to approach this thesis would be to choose a single court case with an 
interesting result, and then interviewed all involved parties. The flaws in this procedure 
are that a single court case would not provide a greater picture on the state of political 
myths, with the result only being reliable for the single case. Although the result would 
be very accurate, the result of a single court case will not be suitable for a later study on 
whether or not court cases affect the legitimacy of the EU, as such a study will need a 
comprehensive assessment of which political myths should be gaining legitimacy.  
As to the other advance commitment on the empirical data selection, the choice of 
Treaty base as basis for choosing court cases. The questions here are; why choose 
Treaty articles as a basis for court cases? And why choose the exact 4 chapters of the 
Lisbon treaty that has been chosen?
4
 The answer to the first question can be found 
partly when one look at other possible delimitations for choosing court cases and in 
what is practical and achievable. There are about 500 individual cases going through the 
European Court of Justice each year with 1146 cases since the Lisbon Treaty went into 
effect on December 1
st
 2009. That is simply an unmanageable large number of cases to 
analyse, even if the focus only were on cases after the Lisbon Treaty. For this reason, 
the focus is only on the most relevant court cases. As EU court cases refer to the Treaty 
Texts as their primary source of legislation, then this is a natural place to divide which 
cases are relevant to political myths. Note that although the Treaty texts are the official 
primary legislation for the EU, then the ECJ has been known to refer to other places for 
                                                          
4
 These 4 chapters are analysed in detail in chapter 6 
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finding legitimacy for rulings, based on common legal principles by Member States 
(Roseberry, 2010: 225). The analysis described in chapter 6 of this thesis is based on the 
EU Lisbon Treaty as basis for choosing court cases. The choice of the Lisbon treaty as 
base is founded on the fact that the EU has evolved over time, thus only the 
contemporary Treaty text is relevant for a contemporary analysis, while previous value 
constellations has evolved and become more explicit in the Lisbon Treaty.  
The reason for choosing the exact 4 chapters of the TEU and TFEU that were chosen is 
based on the overall focus of the articles contained within them. While other chapters of 
the treaties might contain value laden articles, those values are explicitly stated in the 
Common Provisions, the Provisions on Democratic Principles, Provisions having 
General Application and Non-Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union.  
Note that with this discretionary assessed selection of Article sets some court cases with 
relevance might have gone unnoticed. While diminishing the validity of the thesis as 
unnoticed court cases might change the conclusion if they offer a distinctively different 
value hierarchy than in cases based on the chosen articles, the reliability of the thesis 
stays the same under this reservation. It can be argued that it is the primary value 
articles that provide the EU with fuel for its political Myth, and so it is the primary 
value articles that should form the basis for the search. A similar critique can be pointed 
at the fact that the analysis does not also include court cases that is based on value laden 
Directives and Regulations. This choice is made because Directives and Regulations all 
rely on the primary Treaty base as extensions and clarifications of existing articles, and 
their intent should thus be included in the existing Treaty articles, with the reservation 
that the Directives and Regulations could be based on an older version of the treaty that 
had another value hierarchy. In these circumstances, the Directive or Regulation as 
Secondary Legislation should then be amended by the ECJ as they are being tested 
against current Primary Legislation i.e. the Lisbon treaties.  
 
3.2 Establishing a Science Theory 
Moving on from the hypothesis of this thesis, the next item to be discussed is how 
science theory has helped evolve the structure of this thesis. Like most other project 
works this thesis has started with me having an interest and loose idea of how to 
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research it, before being aware of the Science Theory that could be used to guide the 
evolution of that idea, and to govern how it should be researched. A strict compliance 
with the ideal that you bring Science Theory in from the start of the idea phase of a 
project would however hamper the creativity of the project writer. For these reasons, 
Science Theory has become more of an afterthought in the structure of this project, a 
post rationalization if you will. This does not mean that Science Theory is not important 
or play no role in this thesis, just that some of the reflection that it could have provided 
has happened unintentionally and been articulated at a later date.  
The structure of the thesis before thinking of Science Theory is that I would like to 
research political myths closer. From theory learned at a previous semester, I know that 
values of the EU have contradictions with a split between environment, social rights, 
and economy.  
From this initial framework, I already have an idea of how to approach the theory and 
structure my research, while the Science Theory comes in to the picture when I start 
asking the question: Which kind of result do I want?  
Based on the initial reflections then the desired result is one that can somehow prove or 
disprove that political myths exist and have an influence on how the ECJ rules, is itself 
influenced by how the ECJ rules or both. According to scholars on political myths (et al 
Jones, 2010: 91, Della Sala, 2010: 6, Tudor, 1972: 137), then the reason for having 
political myths is to create legitimacy for your own political project or to illegitimatise 
the political project of others.  
The science theory question is how it is possible to make the leap from the legitimacy of 
the Union and into ECJ case rulings. For this purpose I would like to discuss the 
explanatory power of some different Science Theoretical approaches, as well as what it 
would mean for the structure and use of the analysis, with the understanding of political 
myths as the central point of reference. 
While discussing political myths Marxism, Hermeneutic, and the Critical Realism offers 
the best explanations of how political myths can be understood, although the approaches 
lead in different directions once the initial understanding of what a political myth is, and 
what the connection with legitimacy and the courts is.  
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In a Marxist understanding of political myths, they are an instrument enabling the elite 
to control the masses by giving the EU the appearance of possessing a range of qualities 
that it does not necessarily have in order to secure popular support for the project. In 
this context, the understanding of the judicial activism by the EU courts can be 
understood as the courts maintaining a minimum of truth to the myth to allow it to exist. 
In a Marxist comprehension, it is important to understand that it is the economic system 
itself that forces the different elements to act like they do and not because of an active 
choice by for example EU judges to suppress the people (Nielsen, 2004: 188). Market 
forces simply has so much strength that the EU is forced to increase the market 
competition of the EU whenever possible, while environmental and social rights are 
only kept at the minimum required to gather sufficient support for the EU. While the 
Marxist approach does offer a good amount of explanatory power of what the systemic 
functions of the legitimacy of the EU and political myths, it does not offer any 
solutions. While the it might be true that the EU only incorporate more and more social 
rights and environmental protection because it allows the EU to exist, it does not allow 
us to explore the meso- or micro level mechanics that lead to this system, or offer any 
solution of how to change it, if we so desire. 
Moving on to the Hermeneutic explanation, then the hermeneutic circle offer better 
understanding of the relations between a whole and its parts (Højberg, 2004: 312). In 
this thesis, the ontology is the relation between legitimacy, political myths, and judicial 
activism in court cases. The hermeneutic approach then tells us to look at these three 
elements as part of a greater whole suitable for explanatory power. The hermeneutic 
approach is however best suited to look at singular part-whole relations. Meaning that if 
this thesis decided to use the hermeneutic circle as basis for understanding the ontology 
of this project then my own initial framework and research idea would require many 
different hermeneutic analyses without a good idea of how they fit together. Should the 
hermeneutic approach be used, then it would require a more clear understanding of what 
single element that is wanted for study, and in relation to which whole it should be 
studied in. This would offer a viable solution if one were to only research the relation 
between political myths and legitimacy or between single court case rulings and 
political myths. In this kind of research it would be required to select a single or few 
court cases and then explore why the judges has ruled as they have in relation to the 
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political myth. However, this approach does not allow for the possibility of unexpected 
correlations along the way, but only the narrow understanding between the part and the 
whole. 
The final Science Theory that I will comment on here is the Critical Realism. The 
explanations offered by Critical Realism start with the action of an observable 
phenomenon, followed by a structure that allows for investigating the causal 
mechanisms leading up to the observed action. The conclusion on why this phenomenon 
happens is limited by the knowledge that the observable reality is limited, thus the 
conclusion becomes contingent on the realization that the researcher does not have all 
the facts (Jespersen, 2004: 149).  
The initial structure for researching this thesis follows this structure, partly because I 
have used Critical Realism before and therefore already think in the terms this Science 
Theory requires to function.  
It is possible to view changes in the legitimacy of the EU as the observable 
phenomenon, while Political Myths is the mechanism that forms this legitimacy, and 
EU court cases as a practical basis to measure how strong political myths are. The 
interesting in this construction are that legitimacy and court case rulings both form 
observable phenomenon that can use the other to prove or render plausible that EU has 
political myths, and that they have an effect.  
From a Critical Realism perspective, the political myths are a mechanism or structure 
that gain input from, in this case, the consistency of political and judicial activity and 
then in turn affect how able the EU is to make rules that are followed. The fact that 
court cases and legitimacy form two ends of the same equation is reflected in the 
hypothesis structure of this thesis. The first explore how legitimacy theoretically go 
through political myth to found the basis for court cases. While the second hypothesis 
start with how coherent the court cases are, and then investigate the legitimacy of the 
EU by explaining how the coherency of court cases theoretically should affect political 
myths against how well the EU can act in different policy areas. 
The explanatory power of critical realism is however not satisfying by itself –it is too 
unequivocal in its basic cause and effect structure. Therefore, I would like to expand the 
understanding of cause and effect in political concepts as complex as political myths. 
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While I would like to retain that legitimacy is an effect derived from ECJ rulings. I 
would also like to stress that both political myths and the legitimacy of the EU are 
affected by many influences, and therefore it cannot be said that any specific court case 
ruling will change either the political myths that it can be affiliated with, or the 
legitimacy of the EU. A court case ruling can only add to the greater picture of the EU, 
along with a multitude of other factors. It would be feasible to say that in the current 
economic crisis within the EU, it is not the rulings of the ECJ that shape the economic 
myth on the EU, but the actions of EU state leaders and their ability to solve the crisis. 
This will however also make it unfeasible to measure if any specific ruling has any 
tangible effect on the legitimacy of the EU, it would only be possible to see tendencies.  
 
3.3 Interpreting Court Cases 
The next methodical aspect to consider is how the chosen court cases should be 
interpreted. The aim of the interpretation is to find out if the ECJ favour rulings that 
strengthen any specific political myth. There are different ways of doing this analysis 
depending on the overall take on science theory. With Critical Realism, the interest is in 
the reasons behind a court case ruling, while say a Positivist would analyse how many 
court cases numerically adhere to a specific political myth. Although this thesis is 
interested in the reasons behind the rulings, it still need to determine in which direction 
the ECJ steer the EU and thus need to interpret and understand how some court cases 
can be more important, significant or rule giving than others. The discussion starts with 
the function of five different types of legal arguments that can be encountered as part of 
the analysis.  
The first kind of argumentation is the one used in the Mangold court case, which as 
described earlier, has attributed the Human Rights regime with increased legitimacy and 
power by establishing the human rights as a common general rule for the EU 
(Roseberry, 2010: 225). In a Comparative Interpretation the court consult and 
compare solutions with other legal systems. This type of interpretation (and 
argumentation) is only really usable in intergovernmental courts, and only functions 
properly if there are cultural similarities between those ruled over. As such the ECJ can 
both use comparative arguments as a means to legitimise itself, or to send a strong value 
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laden signal by establishing a 3
rd
 party as fundamental to European values. (Hesselink, 
2011: 208) 
The critique against this is that the legal system in other countries cannot be referred to 
as an argument if the legal systems are to have equal independence and status. There is 
however a special case for the ECJ to use this type of argumentation if the cultural 
constituency is the same. This renders European Court of Human Rights rulings to be of 
interest to rulings regarding the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
for example. The ECJ function as a legal system on top of already existing legal 
systems, and has been tasked to find provisions for doing so in a common European 
legal system. 
As a continuation of the Comparative Interpretation, there is the Systematic 
Interpretation (Hesselink, 2011: 203). In a Systematic Interpretation, legal rulings are 
established in the light of a broader set of rules in the same general legal area. In the EU 
that would mean that judges can refer to argumentation already used in another court 
cases if they are part of the same contextual area of the Treaties i.e. you can refer to the 
previous arguments of a case on equal treatment in a case on non-discrimination. The 
use of such argumentation can establish the given court cases as part of the same 
political myth, and confer a reciprocal legitimacy to both cases as they become part of a 
larger and coherent set of rules, thus increasing the predictability of rulings in new areas 
and court cases. 
The next type of arguments derives from a Historical Interpretation (Hesselink, 2011: 
202) of cases. The label 'Historical' refer to the history behind a specific Article, and is 
used when the argument for a law is the original will of the law. Meaning that the 
outcome of the case is an interpretation of how policy should be interpreted as law by a 
judge. This kind of argumentation allows the judge to go beyond the confines of the 
written word. For the purpose of finding political myths in a ruling, then this kind of 
judicial argument is on the one hand hard to argue for as a rule of law, as a principle 
then rely on arbitrary knowledge of policy and 'mind reading'. On the other hand, it does 
confer a more direct link from policy to ruling and can offer more leeway for fair 
judgements, which question whether the role of the judge is to pursue a political project 
or to offer reliable interpretations of the law. 
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In the same category, but slightly different there is the Teleological Interpretation 
(Hesselink, 2011: 204) of the law. In a teleological argumentation the ruling, refer to a 
stated policy aim of legislation, such as Article 2 of the TEU, thus establishing a direct 
link to the stated policy project. For the purpose of this thesis, a teleological argument 
will refer the political myth aspect of a court case to a more legitimate basis as the 
argument behind it will thus be that the political myth is favoured because it is more 
fundamental to the values of the EU. 
The last type of argument is the Literal Interpretation (Hesselink, 2011: 200). This 
type of argumentation has previously been established as the pre-understanding of legal 
text, by a negative statement on Literal Interpretation in the ECJ cases C-402/07 and C-
432/07, where the argumentation behind the rulings were: 
“In interpreting a provision of Community law it is necessary to 
consider not only its wording but also the context in which it 
occurs and the objects of the rules of which it forms part” (C-
402/07 and C-432/07) 
The interesting thing here is not that it is stated that legal argumentation is about 
context, but that it is stated that it is more than wording, giving the wording of a legal 
text the status of being the basis for all other interpretations. The literal interpretation 
and argumentation of EU laws provide a status quo for what the expected outcome of a 
case is. This means that if no other types of argumentation is used in a court case, then it 
is not the ECJ who favour one political myth over another, it is the Treaty itself, and is 
therefore not a good example for finding a favoured position of values. 
 
It seems as if the ECJ rule towards interpretation and evolving the EU law, instead of 
following a very strict adherence to a grammatical interpretation of the law, which 
would give a more reliable (if at times unfair and out of context) rule of law. This code 
of conduct also serves as protection of weaker parties and is more capable of handling 
new areas of policy and law rather, than fair and just resolution of disputes (Hesselink 
204).  
Continuing with the research strategy for finding political myths in EU court cases, then 
there is a research template on how to study cases empirically, with a working model 
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for how to categorize court cases while retaining an interpretive stance. Each case needs 
to be categorized by the importance of its argumentation, if it leans on political myths in 
its argumentation on how to interpret the EU treaties, and how it recreates the political 
myths. This means that I need to analyse the discourse used in the court case, (not to be 
confused with discourse analysis), meaning that the focal point will be the arguments 
used and how they are used, as well as the outcome of the case, as the arguments behind 
it can acknowledge an adherence with the principles supporting a political myth. 
These general types of argumentation by judges can be transformed into a range of 
different types of arguments and actions used by judges in the selected EU court cases. 
Each of these arguments and actions provide an active choice of the judicial strength of 
the political myth associated with the court cases.  
In the interpretation of court cases, they will be sorted by type of argumentation: 
1) If there is a reference in the argumentation to the purpose of the EU, including 
references to Articles that establish the principles of the EU. 
 2) If there is a reference to the original will of an article. 
3) If there is a reference to laws that are common for Member States or to the case law 
of the EU.  
4) If the Court Case leads to the overruling of a regulation or directive.  
5) If there is a references to a 3
rd
 party as a general principles of European law. 
As well as an interpretation of which political myths has been favoured and which, if 
any, has been overruled. The full list of arguments is included in Appendix C. 
Based on these quantitative findings, I can then see if there are any correlation between 
type of argument and type of outcome, which can then be analysed further upon, and 
help me determine if one type of argumentation provide more favouritism (and thus 
legitimacy) than others, by qualitative analysis of typical court cases.  
Explained in other terms, then I will first make a quantitative basis that can show if 
there are any patterns of convergence between types of argumentation and outcome of 
court cases. This then form the basis for a qualitative comparative study of select 
groupings of arguments and outcome, at which point it should be apparent if the judges 
of the ECJ favour any specific set of values, or not. 
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3.4 Defining and Researching Legitimacy 
As mentioned above, the theoretical framework for how the science theory is 
constructed has the ability to examine political myths from two different directions. 
This framework is expressed into two hypotheses in order to make it operational for 
research. One hypothesis examining how political myths dictate what the ECJ attach 
importance to when it rules. The other how political myths give the EU increased 
legitimacy to rule. In this section it will be discussed how it can be researched that 
political myths has increased the EUs legitimacy to rule.  
First, the meaning of legitimacy. Jean-Marc Coicaud defines legitimacy shortly as “the 
right to rule” (Coicaud, 2002: 10), which according to Coicaud has the normative 
meaning that legitimacy justify power and obedience in a community simultaneously 
(Coicaud, 2002: 10). While Coicauds definition is to the point then it does not explain 
the secondary questions derived from its content. It does not explain why one gain the 
right to rule, simply that one has it.  
Another interpretation that try to answer these questions, is given by Max Weber, who 
define legitimacy as a basis for authorities to exercise 'imperative co-ordination',
 5
 which 
basically means that legitimacy ensure that a given community follow the orders of its 
leader(s). (Weber, 1964: 324-325) However, Max Weber claims that there only are 
three pure types of legitimate authority: legal authority, traditional authority, and 
charismatic authority (Weber, 1964: 328). If applied to the EU or the ECJ, then this 
model cannot explain how the ECJ can rule and has competence in areas that are not 
explicitly granted to either the EU or the ECJ as part of a treaty. The legal authority of 
the EU and the ECJ relies on treaty texts and can therefore not ensure authority to a self-
constituted right, as that right does not derive from a higher legal action, such as the 
treaty base. As for the traditional authority, then the EU does not have any such 
authority. The EU is a legal construction based on written contracts (the treaties) which 
means that it has no previous history of rule, thus preventing it from having traditional 
authority. Continuing with the charismatic authority, then Max Weber defines it as:  
                                                          
5 Defined as "the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) from a given source will 
be obeyed by a given group of persons." (Weber, 1964: 324) 
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“...resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional 
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual 
person, and if the normative patterns or order revealed or 
ordained by him.” (Weber, 1964: 328) 
The EU cannot, however, be defined by a single person. The politicians and officials of 
the EU are largely unknown by the European public, and can therefore not be promoters 
of a specific mode of thought. In a looser interpretation of the three pure types of 
authority, the ECJ can however be placed somewhere in between a charismatic 
authority and a legal authority. Meaning that the current way the ECJ can make 
decisions, is that it is allowed for the ECJ to go beyond its legal basis if it has a popular 
normative basis for doing so, which is the basis for the judicial activism of the ECJ. 
 
In order to find an understanding of legitimacy that is useful for this thesis, one need to 
analyse what it is to be used for. The thing to be measured with legitimacy is the effect 
of political myths. So there is need for an understanding of legitimacy that is 
measurable and capable of differentiate between different policy areas. For this reason a 
right to rule definition is not sufficient as mentioned above, but if viewed one policy 
area at a time it can make sense. In an ECJ context, the EU gains legitimacy in an area 
when the ECJ decides that it can rule in an additional policy area. This understanding 
only works as long as the ECJ can produce Webers 'Imperative co-ordination', meaning 
that the rulings of the court are followed. This means that for the purpose of this thesis 
the definition of legitimacy is the ability to rule in a given policy area. 
 This definition sidestep the question of whether or not it is fair or just that someone or 
something rule, it simply states a quality of legitimacy, which is sufficient for the type 
of investigation done in this thesis but not an exhaustive and philosophically sufficient 
definition. At the same time, the above definition of legitimacy is articulated in a way 
where a ruler can have the legitimacy to rule in one policy area and not in another, thus 
associating itself with the concept of competence. The difference between legitimacy 
and competence in this context is that competence is a legal construction whereby 
someone is given the right and duty to rule, while legitimacy is a matter of whether a 
rule is followed, regardless of the reason there is to support that rule. 
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When transformed into operational parameters, there are two main indicators that the 
EU has gained legitimacy: 
1. The ECJ is called on by the Member States as the best place to settle disputes. 
2. That the purpose of the EU requires the ECJ to rule in a policy area. 
In both indicators, it is required that the Member States also honour the ruling made by 
the ECJ. 
Likewise, there are indicators that the EU has lost legitimacy. 
3. That an area previously ruled by the ECJ is now decided between Member 
States. 
4. That a ruling by the ECJ is disregarded. 
 
Before discussing legitimacy more there is an important side note on the relationship 
and often interchangeable nature of the EU and the ECJ in this legitimacy context. The 
legitimacy of the EU i.e. when the EU decides instead of the Member States is 
ultimately expressed as policy areas in which the ECJ can effectively rule. The 
Commission and the Parliament of the EU have the ability to create new laws, which is 
also an expression of rule, and follow the same rules for imperative co-ordination as a 
court case, and can also be viewed as policy areas in which the EU has legitimate rule. 
In this thesis, it is however only the legitimacy generated through the ECJ that is 
researched. 
The next issue is how to investigate if there has been a shift in legitimacy. If we keep 
the thought that new policy areas that the ECJ can effectively rule in constitute 
increased legitimacy for the EU in that specific area, then it follows that the way to 
investigate if the EU has gained legitimacy is to find out if there has been a shift in 
which type of court cases the ECJ rules in.  
In essence I will need to find high profile political issues where the competences of the 
ECJ has either been increased or decreased depending on what type of issue, who refer 
it to the court, and if previous similar issues has been governed by EU institutions or 
not.  
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In the current political climate 3 political cases can be identified where the involvement 
or non-involvement of the ECJ signify a change in the political myths of the EU, and 
thereby its legitimacy. 
These policy areas are: The Acta anti-movement and the balancing between combating 
internet piracy and the right to privacy. The economic crisis in Europe. And how the EU 
handles a breach of the acquis communautaire in the past and now. 
These three cases are identified to currently have the most media coverage and thereby 
best define the identity of the EU to the general public, which in turn constitute the 
political myths of the EU. 
If the second hypothesis:...to prove that there is coherency between ECJ rulings and the 
legitimacy of the EU, is to be tested by viewing which policy areas the ECJ is allowed 
to, or has the ability to, rule in, then must be careful not to overrate the information that 
is gained from the analysis. 
Originally, I had thought that I could prove that the coherency of ECJ rulings had a 
direct effect on the legitimacy of the EU. This approached has however been modified 
as it became apparent that there is no way to prove more than correlations between the 
political myth favoured in ECJ rulings, and the legitimacy, competence and capability 
for justice invested in the ECJ and EU for that policy area.  
This realisation limits the validity of the thesis statement. While it is possible to render 
it probable that ECJ court cases changes the political myths of the EU, and likewise 
possible to render it probable that a change in political myths has changed the 
legitimacy of the EU, it is untenable to claim more than a correlation between facts. The 
main reasons for this are that the ECJ itself is influenced by political myths, and that the 
ECJ is not the only entity that makes up the political myths and identity of the EU. 
What this thesis can contribute with is an understanding of the link between political 
identity and legitimacy. 
 
 
 
  Laust Hougaard Sørensen 
31 
 
4 What is the EU? And What can it do? 
It would seem that the story of identity in the EU present a showcase for issues that 
need to be addressed by any group of nations that undergo a process of increased 
regionalisation, or indeed by institutions intend on a global polity (such as the UN).  
In a context where a community is an interacting collection of states, while it becomes a 
polity when there is a legal obligation between the states, then it would be feasible to 
ask how much a community need to have in common before a central authority gains 
legitimacy in that polity?  
When you look at different international institutions, it becomes apparent that the need 
for common denominators increases with both the depth and the scope of legal 
integration. While it is possible for the IMF to regulate the financial markets of the 
world, it is difficult for the UN to enforce controversial resolutions such as promoting 
human rights or a western ideal of democracy. In addition, if anything the EU is a prime 
example of how politicians can agree on bromides that sound indisputable by the polity, 
without supplying the bromides with any articulated substance. When the issues of 
needing a common identity to widen and deepen the politics of a polity, and the use of 
unarticulated bromides to identify the polity are combined, it can become a problem 
that you have an identity without substance to guide the direction of the community. 
The EU has so far overcome or sidestepped this issue by allowing the ECJ to determine 
the substance and importance of identity creating paragraphs within the treaty base. The 
interesting question in this context with regards to the thesis question is if there is a 
conflict of identities due to insufficient articulation in the treaty base. 
In this thesis, there is a focus on the identity of the EU and how this affects, and in 
return is affected, by principle cases ruled by the ECJ. However, before it is possible to 
address any issues regarding which basis the European Court of Justice process 
principle cases on, it is necessary to first find out what the identity of the European 
Union actually is and why it is so important to know. The main focus of this chapter is 
first to describe how different kind of identities can be attached to the EU, second to 
address why it is important for the EU to have a common identity, and third to present 
different myths that compose the identity of the EU. 
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4.1 The Identity of Europe 
The first item to be addressed is nature of a European identity. Any object or person can 
have more than one identity each relating to different characteristics of said object or 
person, or as Mayer and Palmowski put it: 
“Identity is understood here as a distinctiveness of an 
object or a person, a specifity which marks out, but is not 
necessarily unique to, an object or a person” (Mayer and 
Palmowski, 2004: 576-577). 
An identity can be given by default, such as nationality, the colour of your skin or your 
sex, or it can be acquired through deed and choice. With the EU, however, not all 
identities can be used as a common denominator. According to Mayer and Palmowski 
the EU has 5 different cultural contexts: a historical, a cultural, a constitutional, an 
institutional and a legal (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 575). For the sake of this thesis, 
the constitutional identity will not be commented on as it is addressed at the failed 
constitutional treaty (TCE 2004) and no longer relevant as a subject for a common 
European identity.  
There certainly is a historical identity in Europe; however, it is not necessarily the same 
history or the same Europe that people identify with. Although a historical European 
identity is not common to all the cultures of Europe, it creates a context, or different 
contexts, to view other European identities with. Mayer and Palmowski present the 
same argument that  
“Since some identities are given, it is not difficult to argue 
that a European identity exist by virtue of Europe's 
geographical and historical position alone. Every 
individual and collective set of identities is embedded in 
this European context” (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 
579). 
 However, Mayer and Palmowski, also argues that what one might call European values 
simply because they are strongly represented in European history is not bound to just 
one continent, and therefore, although an identity, not a distinctive one:  
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“It (Europes identity) is determined through an ensemble 
of cultural, religious, economic and ideological factors. It 
is true, however, that these are not necessarily 
distinctively European as such. Capitalism, Christianity, 
and humanism are pursued beyond Europe, and often with 
much greater vigour.” (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 579)  
Although markers of culture, religion, economy and ideology is not restricted to a 
European identity Mayer and Palmowski argue that there still is a distinct European 
civilization build on the combination of the rivalry between secular and religious 
powers, and the relative strength of the periphery against the centre (Mayer and 
Palmowski, 2004: 579). The problem with those kind of identifiers are that although 
much of Europe participated in both religious wars and colonialism, the narratives of 
these experiences suggest national or religious patriotism rather than a unifying 
common history. 
A similar narrative stretch into the 20
th
 century where the experiences of both World 
Wars created a common memory of both suffering and occupation amongst the Axis 
and Allies, the national myths of uniform heroism created to bolster the post-war 
regimes of Europe acted to differentiate rather than unite the historical identities of 
Europe (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 579). Although the European Coal and Steel 
Community emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, then it was not at the 
time an expression of historical identity, but rather a necessity that exposed the 
European frailty in a new world order. The post war period in Europe can be described 
as a time of defeat for all of Europe, thus denying this common history the possibility to 
create a positive historical identity: 
“...following the Second World War, many political and 
intellectual leaders were inspired to overcome the nadir of 
European history with a return to European humanist, 
enlightened and democratic traditions. At the same time, 
the western part of Europe gained an institutional 
dimension through the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1952 and the EEC in 1958 at precisely the 
time when a popular European feeling of community was 
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at a low ebb. 1945 left not simply Germany, but the whole 
of Europe humiliated, as the Dutch were to find out in 
Indonesia in 1946-7, the French in Indochina in 1954, and 
the British and French at Suez in 1956. It is quite 
legitimate, therefore, to consider the foundation of the 
EEC not as a sign of European strength and an expression 
of its historical identity, but an admission of weakness, an 
institutional creation necessitated precisely by the lack of 
positive identity that could have sustained itself between 
the two power blocs of the cold war.” (Mayer and 
Palmowski, 2004: 580) 
As such the founding myth, if any, of the EU is one of defeat and not one to foster a 
greater allegiance to a supranational community. Furthermore, that the EU cannot refer 
itself to a popular, historic founding myth akin to the US Declaration of Independence, 
the Glorious Revolution with its cause of parliamentary sovereignty, or Bastille Day. 
This means that it has been difficult to define a common, positive, and transcendent 
ideal of what the later EEC and EU was about, and what it differentiated itself from. 
This lack still haunts the Union even to this day. (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 580) In 
the modern EU, we still got tell tales of this lack of common historical denominators. 
Europe's most widely used representations, euro notes and coins, only present artefacts 
from a fictional, rather than real historical and shared past, (Mayer and Palmowski, 
2004: 581) while the buildings of the EU's institutions is inspired by forward-looking 
modernism rather than representing long lasting stability and historical heritage (Mayer 
and Palmowski, 2004: 581). Mayer and Palmowski go so far as to conclude,  
“There is no sign that the European Union has made any 
headway in creating an historical identity amongst the 
people of its Member States.” (Mayer and Palmowski, 
2004: 581)  
Thus dismissing historical identification as being prominent in the EU.  
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The next marker for identity is the cultural marker (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 575). 
The argument is that there is no historical identity, so the cultural identity is also diverse 
and national specific. Mayer and Palmowski even remark that  
“Europe's cultural hallmark has been precisely its 
heterogeneity and multiplicity.” (Mayer and Palmowski, 
2004: 582) and that this has been taken into account within 
the EU thus “Brussels has identified its cultural agenda as 
the preservation of Europe's diversity” (Mayer and 
Palmowski, 2004: 582).  
A sentiment established with EUs official motto: 'United in diversity'.
6
 Mayer and 
Palmowski argue that if diversity in itself is considered European then it is difficult for 
it to provide Europeans with a positive cultural identification (Mayer and Palmowski, 
2004: 582-583). Within the cultural sphere, we also find the problem of a common 
European language, or rather, the lack there off. Within Europe, language is a strong 
national identifier where almost every nation-state has its own language. This both 
present a practical problem of condoning business and building social relations across 
borders, it also hinder popular identification with politicians and the communities of 
others. (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 581) The conclusion from Mayer and Palmowski 
are thus that although there is a distinct European culture and civilization, the nature of 
its being negates its effect as a unifying identifier. 
Moving on to identify markers within the EU, we find the institutions of the Union. 
Mayer and Palmowski claim that at first glance it would be hard for a common citizen 
to relate to the Union institutions because,  
“...institutions of the European Union have done their best 
to remain detached from any expression of a single 
identity. Their offices remain scattered all over Europe, as 
the European agencies or the ECB have been located 
outside Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg...moreover 
the European Community has created structures and 
administrative processes that are unique in their nature 
                                                          
6 http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/ last accessed 19/03/2012 
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and complexity. In any language, it is almost impossible to 
fathom what the Ecofin Council, the Coreper, the 'Antici', 
the Euro group, the DG RELEX, and the troika actually do 
and what they mean.”(Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 585)  
However, this is contrasted by Eurobarometer polls favouring the EU institutions with a 
high public approval rate meaning that the peoples of Europe identify themselves better 
with European institutions than with national representatives sent to Brussels (Mayer 
and Palmowski, 2004: 585). This point to the EU's ability to promote itself as an 
authority within areas that has high visibility and citizen awareness.  
Since the 1990s the Commission has promoted and sustained a reputation as a guardian 
of consumer rights in the area of environmental control and competition legislation (ex. 
European Standards and merger control), even relating directly to individual citizens 
against its own government's pursuit of national interest. Particularly the European 
Commission has successfully made an impression of itself as a strong independent 
authority, especially after the Single European Act with its extension of areas under the 
EC's purview (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 586). The reason for the strong expression 
of EU institutions is rooted in the nature of the EU. As there are no historical or cultural 
identifiers to build a common identity on, the actions of the European Institutions are to 
a greater extent the carriers of a European Union myth, the strongest of which concern 
the reunification of Europe and the Unions support of humane problem solutions, 
instead of the 'Old Europe'… 
...”Where extreme policy differences used to be contested 
through military conflict, they are now expressed through 
late-night bargaining in supranational institutions, based 
on the rule of law. In this sense, European institutions can 
even be seen as the decisive expressions of a 'new' 
European post-1945 identity...” (Mayer and Palmowski, 
2004: 586)  
Thus, European Institutions reinforce the democratic legitimacy of its Member States 
and has in return become the platform upon which a new found European 'tradition' of 
rationality and enlightenment in international relations has been placed. (Mayer and 
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Palmowski, 2004: 587) The principle by which the EU has changed interactions 
between nations has been through the rule of law. It is the Member States adherence to 
the rule of law that has made it possible the EU to establish the EU as an effective 
supranational authority that in turn has improved European integration. Mayer and 
Palmowski describe the connection between rule of law and European Identity thus: 
“National law emanates from the supremacy of the 
national constitution, be it a text or a functional 
equivalent. These in turn define the political, social, 
economic and cultural foundations that characterize each 
individual state. For this reason, the creation of a 
European body of law that has acquired constitutional 
status has been a singular success story that had a crucial 
effect on the nature of European integration...Beginning 
with the rulings that established the direct effect of 
European law at the national level (Van Gend en Loos, 
1963) and the primacy of European over national law 
(Costa, 1964), European law has gained constitutional 
status by affecting the legal status of the individual 
directly, in terms of rights and duties, and in this way 
expresses what Europe is and what it aspires to be.” 
(Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 587)  
The rulings and national responses in the cases of Van Gend en Loos and Costa, has 
shown that governments of Member States has been willing to empower the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) with inertia, even though it diminished the Member States power 
of self-determination in other cases legally inside the jurisdiction of the EU. These cases 
have furthermore shown that Member States are content to accept an assumed 
rationality of the law, (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 588) which in turn has given the 
ECJ a level of independence that is unprecedented by any supranational organ.  
As a result, the ECJ has become acutely aware of how well the public would accept its 
decisions, and has corresponded accordingly (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 588). Thus, 
the ECJ has mirrored the public mood of the EU in its rulings. An example of the 
Court's sensitivity towards the perception of European integration is the Court's opinion 
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on EC membership of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Here, the 
court held that the EC could not accede to the ECHR without prior modification of the 
treaties, emphasizing the 'constitutional nature' of such accession. This reflects the 
concern about the boundaries of the EU’s powers expressed by the German 
Constitutional Court some time earlier in its Maastricht decision. (Mayer and 
Palmowski, 2004: 588)  
As the workings of the ECJ can be seen as expressing a general mood of the peoples of 
Europe, that is not necessarily synonymous with the will of the national governments, 
the ECJ has become pivotal in expressing substantive aspects of European identity. This 
in turn gives every ECJ decision a symbolic and identifying value as well as a legal one 
(Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 589).  
In this regard, Mayer and Palmowski have identified an important similarity between 
national and EU law with regard to its effectiveness and non-legal legitimacy:  
“Just as a national level law can be considered as a 
cultural and political artefact which, for its effectiveness, 
needs to represent a majoritarion consensus, so European 
law for its effectiveness, has had to represent a popular 
consensus beyond the political realm... The ECJ could not 
have embarked on its integrationist phase in the 1970s 
and 1980s had this contradicted a majoritarian consensus 
amongst the peoples of Europe, just as it had to moderate 
its judgements in the 1990s in order to reflect a changed 
public mood.” (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 589)  
This would suggest that the rulings of the ECJ are not only seated in what could be 
called the 'Elites Project Europa' but also as an expression of public opinion and thus 
identity.  
The conclusion to what identifies the EU in a meaningful way, must be that there is no 
'given' identity to the Union, neither cultural nor historical, but instead the unique way 
the institutions of the EU has implemented a supranational leadership through the rule 
of law. Additionally, the ECJ has proved itself as a strong symbolic identifier, a role 
that it is keenly aware of and acts consciously upon. 
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4.2 Identity and Community 
The question is why does the EU need a strong identity? The answer lies in another 
question: why do we need the EU? The EU need to legitimise itself, and has done a 
good job creating reasons in the past. As mentioned earlier the EU is a post-war project 
and has branded itself as such. During its infancy, the EU had its legitimacy in mending 
the economies of post-war Europe and after 1989; it had a reunification project with 
Eastern Europe. This increased integration and enlargement require a common identity 
(Wintle, 2009: 435). Now that the initial hype of the Berlin wall is over the EU need to 
look for a new reason to exist that appeal to a generation that has neither experienced 
World War 2 or can remember the Cold War.  
According to Michael Wintle the EU is both very aware of its own need for legitimacy 
and visibility in popular culture, and has mounted a massive PR campaign on the border 
to blatant propaganda:  
“There is little doubt that those who have been 
enthusiastic about the European project in the second half 
of the twentieth century have attempted to orchestrate a 
campaign to stimulate enthusiasm for Europe and the E-
institutions by means of propaganda in the sense of 
publicity material (much of it visual) which puts a positive 
gloss in identifying with Europe...Various committed 
Euroidealists went into print to spread the word about 
'our beloved Europe' in the most immoderate terms, and a 
torrent of shamelessly positive images began to pour off 
the EU presses, especially in the 1990s, such as laughing 
children playing with EU ballons in the Grande Place in 
Brussels. Memorabilia were churned out, in the form of 
mugs, cups, ashtrays, glasses, ornaments and eggcups, for 
sale in the parliament buildings in Strasbourg and 
Brussels, and in the special EU shop on the Rond Point 
Schuman in the ER quarter in Brussels.” (Wintle, 2009: 
434-435)  
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This kind of identity creation does not create much substance or legitimacy for the EU 
to exist. Mayer and Palmowski has noted there has also been a 'value-added' European 
identity that have been reshaped, expressed and amplified through the process of 
European integration since the 1950s (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 592). According to 
Louisa Passerini this 'value-added' European identity is conceptualized to recognize the 
changes between the present, the past and the future, and which allows us to break with 
Eurocentrism and hierarchies between European countries and regions. (Passerini: 24) 
Meaning that the focal point of the EU identity is to distance itself from the European 
past, while still remembering why we do not want to repeat it. Passerini go further in 
describing the dual nature of needing both continuity and discontinuity at the same time: 
“We require continuity in criticizing this (European 
culture) heritage, and discontinuity in breaking with those 
aspects of the heritage which we do not want to ignore but 
neither to reproduce in some novel form, such as 
colonialism, genocide, the persecution of minorities, the 
oppression and degradation of women, blacks, Jews, 
gypsies, and many others. To stress only the continuity of 
the European ideal would impose a false parmanence on a 
very diverse and 'broken' history.” (Passerini: 25)  
This does indeed create a legitimate reason for the EU to exist. It serves the role of 
reminding the European States of the past as well as facilitating ways to prevent it 
repeating itself. This is a role that the EU has used to legitimize itself not only in social 
politics but also in supranational politics. The EU has established itself as a mediator 
between EU Member States. This has successfully created the myth of the EU as a 
project of peace and a 'soft' alternative to the 'hard' politics of the USA (Manners: 2002) 
as remarked by Mayer and Palmowski:  
“...the internal mediation of Member State differences 
through the EU has been accompanied by a marked and 
continuing reduction in friction between national 
identities. The lack of a hostile, competitive nationalism 
between the countries of Europe has been a truly 
remarkable achievement by the EU, both in the context of 
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the continent´s history and its geopolitical environment. 
National identities still matter, but within the EU the 
barriers between them have become permeable...By 
transforming international and intercultural disputes into 
internal arguments resolved through the mediation and 
the rule of law, the treaties manifested and amplified a 
post-war myth of humanism, civilization and culture, 
which was integral to the successful nation-building 
attempts of most Member States.” (Mayer and Palmowski, 
2004: 590-592)  
And the sustained effect of this approach is that European identity is already much 
stronger than it was decades ago (Kaelberer, 2004: 174). Matthias Kaelberer Has noted 
that besides the post-war myth the EU has also managed to establish itself as 
indispensable in the economic sector of the EU, where Kaelberer states: 
“The EU plays a largely irreversible role in economic 
production and market transactions among European 
countries. It is difficult to envision a Europe reversing the 
common market. War among the major European powers 
is even more unthinkable. Moreover the EU has an 
emerging constitutional structure. The European Court of 
Justice and European legal principles have become part of 
daily life. A Europe without borders is a reality for many 
travellers. Many cross national activities take Europe for 
granted.” (Kaelberer, 2004: 174-175)  
The control of money is associated with the concepts of sovereignty and state power 
since the emergence of the nation state in the late nineteenth century. Since then there 
has been a dogma of one nation having one kind of money. According to this 
perspective, coins and banknotes have frequently defined the boundaries of a political 
entity and a symbol of sovereignty. Political elites have often used money to construct 
specific political identities and social boundaries. (Kaelberer, 2004: 161) 
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So, there is no question that the EU has already had a great impact on the European 
lifestyle and has become a part of everyday life. It is not insignificant that, within 
Member States, the term 'Europe' has become increasingly synonymous with the 
institutions of the European Union. The EU is however not synonymous with the 
European continent, although one major motivation for the central and eastern European 
countries in joining the EU was the desire to be 'part of Europe' again. By becoming full 
members of the EU institutions the eastern countries not only prove that they are part of 
Europe, but also that they live up to the European ideal. Thus, the institutional and legal 
mechanisms of the European Union have enabled Europe to overcome its historical 
divisions, and to 'invent' a new identity based on popular notions of justice, and the 
legalization of intra-European conflict. (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 590)  
However, the EU has now, completed the European unification process, and thus faces a 
new crisis of identity and legitimacy. The economic integration has reached a level 
where it needs a more public political area to continue. Indeed, it is correct when 
Kaelberer points out that  
“...the intensity of European integration...has led to 
increasing legitimacy problems and a democratic deficit. 
Solving these problems requires a corresponding increase 
in European identity and the development of a public 
political space that would allow the pursuit of joint 
European policies based on democratic legitimacy.” 
(Kaelberer, 2004: 175) 
These legitimacy problems have resulted in a series of political events within the EU in 
recent years. The French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the 
Irish rejection of the Lisbon treaty in 2008 and the historically low number of voters in 
the European Parliament elections 2009 has exposed a long-standing problem with EU 
politics. The increasing gap between public support for increased integration and the 
breadth of the EU policy proposed by the Brussels Political Elites. (Lenschow and 
Sprungk, 2010: 132) It can be argued whether the legitimacy problem faced by the EU 
has become greater and more severe over time, or if just became visible through the 
negative referendum results and low voter turnouts. (Lenschow and Sprungk, 2010: 
133). What is really being challenged by this crisis is the democratic legitimacy of the 
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European institutions, and so the European Union in general. (Mayer and Palmowski, 
2004: 574) And here comes the real reason for the EU to create a unifying identity that 
can generate general support. Lenshow and Sprungk have presented a possible solution, 
or at least a place for the EU to start looking for one:  
“While the legitimacy dilemma has many facets which call 
for various solutions, the ultimate goal of any problem-
solving strategy is to generate public support for the 
European project...the challenge may rely on finding a 
new vision to appeal to generations for whom the 
compelling story of European integration as the motor of 
peace and stability on the continent does not resonate so 
strongly. What Europe needs, therefore, are some new 
myths that capture the essence of the European project...In 
fact, successful myths are capable of creating a sense of 
belonging and/or generating consensus for the use of 
political power. In other words, myths can help to gain 
support for the polity through the forging of a common 
identity and the creation of solidarity.” (Lenschow and 
Sprungk, 2010: 134)  
a notion mirrored by Mayer and Palmowski who state that:  
“...the questionof a common identity, at least for the EU 
Member States, has become one of the central issues 
facing the EU today.” (Mayer and Palmowski, 2004: 574) 
The answer to the EU's problems finding public support can be sought after in 
sustaining and creating myths about the EU that is appealing to the peoples of Europe, 
thus highlighting subjects that are easy for all peoples to support. In the following 
chapter we will look at what myths are, and which myths the EU has generated about 
itself.  
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5 The Political Myths of the EU  
In 1972, Henry Tudor defined myths as “a story, a narrative of events in dramatic 
form” (Tudor 1972: 137). In the context of political myths, this definition is not enough 
though.  
First off, using the word myth as part of a scientific work needs a more thorough 
explanation of what is meant. A myth is not a children's story or an old system of belief. 
A myth is a story that is told to simplify a complex area of understanding, and thrive on 
those who tell the story. For a myth to go beyond being simple political spin it need to 
be retold to a point where it gains a life of its own, and in essence becomes a part of 
everyday knowledge.  
In order for a myth to do this it need a hold in reality, something to grow out from, and 
as such 
 “…myths do not hide the truth and yet they do simplify 
and so distort our view of the empirical world. Myths tend 
towards (or to evolve into) regularities or generalizations. 
And myths lay claim to a 'depoliticized' objectivity that is 
not free from the constraints of the subjective observer but 
that nevertheless promises to reveal something enduring 
about the world as we perceive it.”(Jones 2010: 91)  
Furthermore, myth-making is also important for social organizations, such as the EU, 
both to legitimize its function externally as well as providing internal purpose direction 
and identity for those who work in the organization (Della Sala 2010: 6) 
If viewed from a more methodical stand, myths have three stages of embedding itself 
into reality, diffusion, ritual and sacredness. At first stage, a range of actors will seek 
some gain through the spreading of a certain narrative. At the second stage the myth, 
become a ritual entering policies, discourses, and practises. And at third stage it 
becomes sacred and talking against the myth is to question the political community it is 
founded upon. (Della Sala 2010: 8-9)  
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Over the course of the years, different groups has so successfully embedded political 
ideas into an everyday understanding of what is right and wrong, that it has begun to 
become a source of legitimacy in itself, thus making it into political myths. Legitimacy 
in this context should be read as the process of explaining and justifying. Thus 
depending on a positive as well as a normative assessment of the state of the world, 
meaning that people need to first accept that the world actually works as the storyteller 
says it does, before they can agree on how they as a collective should respond (Jones 
2010: 92).  
Examples of this kind of myths are democracy and the human rights agenda, both of 
which have been adopted by the EU. What makes a myth political  
“…is not necessarily the contents of the story (or stories) 
which underpin it but the extent to which the narrative 
responds to and addresses the political conditions of a 
given group” (Bottici and Challand 2006: 318)  
…as well as its purpose of generating legitimacy for political rule. (Lenschow and 
Sprungk 2010: 136) Storytellers construct a discourse with the general public in order to 
gain – and claim – public legitimacy. Furthermore, they construct a vision for Europe, 
which transforms the old notion of the EU as a 'motor of peace and stability' into a 
modern image of protection. This new image has had a higher appeal to the younger 
generation of European citizens than the post-war foundational myth of European 
integration has had. (Lenschow and Sprungk 2010: 151) 
 
The EU face other challenged than a nation-state when it comes to creating myths, for 
the purpose of legitimacy and identity. Most nation-states can create a sense of 
belonging and a right to rule through the stories of its creation and history or through 
points of resemblance in its constituency. So where France got a creational myth in the 
violence of the French revolution against the aristocracy and Denmark has the peaceful 
and tidy Danish transition from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy through 
the 'peaceful will of the people'. The EU has no such creational myth or other communal 
basis such as ethnicity or values from a common history, which require it to create 
myths and tell stories according to functional lines (Lenschow and Sprungk 2010: 136). 
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A functional myth means that the myth needs to relate to current and on-going issues in 
the world both for it to emerge as well as occasionally prove that there is a truth to it 
before it can continue to survive. This does not mean that the story cannot deviate from 
or go beyond reality, but as a functional myth, it requires a closer and on-going link to 
real world events. (Lenschow and Sprungk 2010: 147) Furthermore, a polity that bases 
its legitimacy on myths of rationality…  
“…faces a different kind of test for those narratives to 
survive. Since the appeal of these myths is precisely 
functional efficiency rather than a reference to a distant 
historical event that may have founded a nation, it 
requires the occasional demonstration of this efficiency.” 
(Lenschow and Sprungk 2010: 147) 
To sustain a European myth it is important to ensure sufficient support and positive 
awareness among the European public. In order for it to take on a life of its own the 
myth needs to carry beyond the cycles of policy-making and public acceptance and 
become a true identity for the European Union as a whole. While born in facts and 
supported through public expectations and wants, the functional dimension of a myth 
such as an environmental Europe needs to be seen by the people of Europe as an 
identifier for the general image of Europe for the myth to emerge and be sustainable 
(Lenschow and Sprungk 2010: 142). The next sections of this chapter will go more in 
depth with three different myths that has emerged and become a central part of both the 
EU, and how the EU view and govern itself. As the offset of this thesis is based on my 
personal experience from classes in Symbolism and Myths of the EU by Ian Manners, it 
comes natural that the myths I have chosen to attribute to the EU are the same as those 
Ian Manners has previously identified. Manners has identified three distinct political 
myths as apparent in the EU: the economic, the environmental and the social myth of 
Europe (Manners 2010). 
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5.1 The Economic Europe 
The first of these myths are the economic myth, which is one of the oldest in the EU 
context. The core of the myth concerns how the EU through the governance of 
competition and free market mechanics provide wealth for the Member States, and 
peace through interconnected economies.  
The foundation and emergence of the economic myth has its start with the early 
competition policy in the EU, where the rules written into the treaties and the lack of 
competition policy experience and expertise in the Europe of the 1950s exposed the 
Commission to especially internal pressure. This spurred key individuals within the 
EU's governance network into a response and develop a series of myths that linked the 
legal provisions relating to competition policy to the main goals of the European 
project, the competitiveness of the European economy and the interests of the individual 
citizens (Akman and Kassim 2010: 113).  
The official mythology that emerged in the late 1950s is remarkable for its longevity, 
coherence, and consistency, persisting despite the very different views and outlooks of 
the individuals who have held the position of Commissioner for competition. It has also 
survived changes in the size and scope of the Communities, developments in the 
European economy and changing intellectual fashions in competition policy. (Akman 
and Kassim 2010: 116).  
One explanation for this success is that the competition myths has had a huge impact in 
the rhetoric used by both politicians and governance officials of the EU thus enabling it 
to 'blur' into the general landscape of the EU as new Member States joined the Union. 
As it was linked to the goal of territorial integration (Akman and Kassim 2010: 116), 
and argumentation was that competition policy… 
 “is one of the objectives of the Treaty to guarantee 
balanced trade and speedy raising of the standards of 
living...It would be useless to bring down the trade 
barriers between the Member States if the governments or 
private industries were to remain free through economic 
or fiscal legislation, through subsidies to cartel-like 
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restrictions on competition, virtually to undo the opening 
of the markets and to prevent, or at least unduly delay, the 
action needed to adapt them to the Common Market” (Sir 
Leon Brittan paraphrased in Akman and Kassim 2010: 
116)  
The message here is clear. Without a solid competition policy, the European Union 
would descent into chaos and competition policy is key to achieving economic 
prosperity, which is one of the fundamental aims of the European project. (Kroes 2008: 
2)  
This gives the Commission a legitimate reason to exist in their role as custodians of the 
EU's rules by linking EU competition policy to the fundamental purposes of the 
Community (Akman and Kassim 2010: 119). The outcome of this narrative is that the 
EU competition policy is now a well-established feature of law and governance that 
controls anti-competitive behaviour within the Union, but with an influence that reaches 
far beyond its borders. As the first successful supranational policy, competition policies 
are regarded today as an intrinsic element of the internal market and an indissoluble part 
of the European project. The Commission's authority is unquestioned, even if particular 
decisions are criticized. EU competition rules provide the model for many national 
regimes, and has thus gained status as a 'sacred' part of the EU – to question the 
Commission and the EU's competence in this area is to undermine the entire European 
Union Project (Akman and Kassim 2010: 128).  
Examination of the history of the EU competition myth reveals, however…  
“…the uncertainties and precariousness of its 
development. Approaching the experience from the 
perspective of myths and myth-making highlights the 
Commission's consciousness from the Community's 
earliest days of the need to justify its authority and its 
intense efforts so to do”. (Akman and Kassim 2010: 128)  
While this fulfil the expectation that the EU institutions will attempt to develop a 
narrative that explains and justifies their purpose, when its competence is in doubt. Then 
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the question is how far the ECJ will go to secure and maintain this myth by favouring 
competition over other of EU's values.  
 
5.2 The Environmental Europe 
As a contrast to the economic Europe, we have the green Europe. The green Europe 
differ in both that it is a relatively new myth and has only gradually won acceptance as 
an established part of the EU set up while it caters to another group of people. The 
economic Europe caters to a generation who has tried economic hardship and the terrors 
of World War 2, and can therefore identify with the experience of gaining peace and 
prosperity. The green Europe, on the other hand, comes with a notion of greater 
responsibility that earns sympathy with the generation that has grown up hearing stories 
of acid rain, a diminishing ozone layer, and melting icecaps, which has then become a 
new area for the EU to legitimize itself.  
It is often used as an argument in debates on the EU that some problems stretch across 
borders, and therefore the solutions should too, thus the myth of a green Europe has 
emerged as something that the European people want and expect from EU policy-
makers (Lenschow and Sprungk 2010: 142). The idea of a green Europe has not been a 
foundational myth of European integration, but has been developed in parallel, and at 
times in competition, with other functional myths (Lenschow and Sprungk 2010: 136). 
The green Europe as a positive myth about the EU is a good example of how political 
myths recreate the political entity it comes from, and it has now become praxis for the 
EU to brand itself on responsibility for the climate. As such the environmental Europe 
can be seen as a 'brand attribute' of Europe, a particular feature that distinguishes 
Europe from other political entities and a feature that adds to a common identity. 
(Lenschow and Sprungk 2010: 136)  
As to the emergence of the myth, then Della Sala holds that “myths are born in facts, 
but then takes on a life on their own in the hands of storytellers and listeners” (Della 
Sala: 2010). This then again means that the myth of a green Europe would have 
emerged at a time in which Europe was pushing forward environmental policies, which 
it did as a by-product of competition policy, when the EU began to regulate issues in the 
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area of chemicals, water, air and waste and often established high standards of 
protection. This suggests that at the national level environmental issues were emerging 
and forcing themselves into market relations (Lenschow and Sprungk 2010: 138).  
The interesting in this story is that while the EU did not start as a serious pusher of 
green policies, then the EU's hunt for legitimacy has now made the EU Commission one 
of the largest players at environmental fora such as the COP meetings, underpinning 
both the power of myths and their ability to generate legitimacy.  
Although the myth of a green Europe seem to have been successfully established and 
seems to be appealing to new generations. Then, unlike in the case of foundational 
myths, such as peace in Europe through competition policy, storytellers have to make a 
stronger effort and show that Europe is both actually green and that it is the right place 
to carry a green mission (Lenschow and Sprungk 2010: 135). Without a continued 
support from the ECJ, the myth of an environmental Europe would be hard to maintain. 
If the Court continually rule against environmental policies, or if the Commission is not 
able to back its green policies up, then the legitimacy that would be gained by a strong 
green brand would disappear.  
 
5.3 The Social Europe 
The last myth to be discussed here is the social Europe political myth. In many ways, 
the social Europe is fostered through a combination of social changes in Europe and a 
change in the role of the judiciary system (Gestel & Micklitz, 2011: 41).  
1968 became a landmark for social and legal change in Europe which were introduced 
with the German student revolt and mirrored in the French May revolution subsequently 
paved the road for the later social character of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 
and the founding of the Internal Market (Gestel & Micklitz, 2011: 42). The message 
from 1968 were that law should not only codify existing norms in the society and put it 
into writing from a bottom up perspective, but rather take a stance and steer political 
projects and become part of an overall policy (Gestel & Micklitz, 2011: 37). The idea 
was that the law should serve to redistribute wealth, to domesticate economic power and 
to secure liberty and justice for the weakest in society.  
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In its purest form, this type of judicial praxis proved unsuccessful when faced with 
detailed legislation and public instructions. The result became to leave more power to 
the executive and judiciary power based on legislature of framework laws, which in a 
European context became a project of integration through law (Gestel & Micklitz, 2011: 
37).  
With the completion of the internal market, the EU started on an increasingly technical 
cooperation between Member States, and began to make integration without law. This 
opened up for cooperation in other areas than those included in the EU treaties, as cross 
border governance started to harmonise the foundations for a knowledge based 
economy that reached into the social sphere (Gestel & Micklitz, 2011: 45).  
Since the turn down of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, there has however, been a new 
approach, where the European integration goes beyond the laws of the EU, and start to 
find a legal order based partly on law and partly on politics, as a substitute for a formal 
constitution (Gestel & Micklitz, 2011: 47).  
One of the primary places that the EU, and the ECJ in particular, has a substitute for a 
bill of rights, is international conventions on universal rights, even so when not all 
Member States of the EU had yet ratified those laws and conventions. In the cases of 
Defrenne III the ECJ referred to the Economic and Social committee (ESC) and 
International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions, to establish protection against 
discrimination based on sex, as a fundamental right, although 3 Member States had not 
yet ratified the conventions.  
The interesting part comes when the ECJ later in the case Mangold recognised non-
discrimination based on age as a principle even though age is not explicitly mentioned 
as a grounds for non-discrimination in any of the conventions, while the ECJ 
argumentation were based on general provision for social integration under the 
Employment Guidelines of the European Council (Helsinki 2000). Subsequently the 
Lisbon treaty has included the specific provisions for non-discrimination based on age 
in the Charter for Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Roseberry, 2010: 225). 
The main carrier of the social political myth has thus been judicial activism by the ECJ 
that has subsequently made it into the treaty base. Besides the rights based equal 
treatment and non-discrimination regime, which in essence is equal access to the free 
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market, there has been an increased focus on the term solidarity in the rhetoric of the 
EU. According to Ulla Neergaard (2010), the concept of Solidarity in EU context 
appears to resemble an Organic Solidarity rather than a Mechanical Solidarity. This 
means that the solidarity does not come from the fact that we are all Europeans and 
defined together in relation to others, but as a solidarity where we understand that all 
Member States are part of the same political (and economic) project, and therefore 
affect each other, and need to work together, or at least stop working against each other 
(Neergaard, 2010: 114). Neergaard argues that although the term solidarity has become 
popular in the rhetoric of the EU, it has not yet reached a level that makes economic 
redistribution possible (Neergaard, 2010: 137). It only exist on a larger scale, where 
Europeans has only started to realize that they are part of the same social economy, 
although some discussions do suggest that too much economic inequity creates 
solidarity problems in a mechanical sense for the EU.  
Despite Neergaards projection from 2010 that the a redistributive mechanic in the EU is 
far out in the future, then the current economic crisis solution in the EU has elements 
that point in that direction. The financial pact between 25 Member States redistribute 
money through the structural funds to poor EU countries (Boersen.dk 3/2/2012). As 
such, the rhetoric that has created a social political myth is founded upon market 
principles, but has later grown out of those ideals and has gained a life of its own. In 
essence, the social political myth of the EU focuses on universal rights, anti-
discrimination and to some degree a minimum of living standard. 
With some basic myths about the EU in place as carriers and providers of legitimacy, it 
is time to see how these myths is represented in the treaty text of the EU and if there is 
any difference in the strength to which the EU constitutionally commit to these myths. 
This should provide a basis for later testing of whether the EU court rule in favour of 
any particular aspect of the EU identity. 
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6 The Principle Values of Europe 
In the previous chapter the concept of myths were discussed. One of the theoretical 
links that this thesis seeks to explain and investigate is how the hierarchy between 
Political Myths in the EU is affected by Court Case rulings. The basis for this link is 
that the values found in the articles concerning the principles of the EU is contradicting, 
and that those values mirror the essence of the Political Myths. In this understanding a 
ruling express or suppress a value in the EU also express or supress a Political Myth. 
In the following chapter, there is a historical review of the development of values in the 
stated purpose of the EU, and a review of which values that a select part of the Lisbon 
Treaty base has. As a part of this review, the term Value Articles will be used. Value 
Articles refer to an article in the law base that explicitly or implicitly confer a value or 
principle to the EU. The goal of this chapter is to find the most relevant value articles to 
base the empirical analysis on. 
When articulating the values of the EU, one has to remember that the concept of values 
should be understood rather wide in an EU context. When this thesis concerns itself 
with how EU values affect EU myths, then the values included must correspond to these 
myths. Therefore, the concept of Value Articles in this thesis also include general aims 
of the Union, as there is an uncertainty of how to classify concepts such as 'an increase 
of living standards'. While not articulated as a value, it is certainly something that the 
Union strive and aim for in a similar fashion. While on can be led to believe that the 
aims of the Union is something separate and contingent on, or the outcome of, the 
application of EU values, it can be seen more as a parallel track of values within the EU. 
The question is whether the aims of the EU are a natural continuation of its values or if 
the aims are a perquisite for the realisation of the values. The EU has named the values 
upon which it has been build and what the aims of the Union are in its treaty base. 
However, there are also other interpretations of how important these values are, and 
which purpose they have. During the Copenhagen summit in 1973 economic progress 
were also included as a Value. Although it was as a means rather than as an end: 
“…the principles of representative democracy, of the rule 
of law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of 
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economic progress – and of respect for human rights” (EC 
Bull 12-1973 118-22). 
Regardless of the relationship between aims and values of the EU, both are included in 
the concept of Value Articles. Regardless of how the relationship is viewed, both aims 
and values have the same qualities regarding their ability to sustain or undermine EU 
myths.  
 
6.1 The History of Value Articles 
Given the long history and change in both scope and width of the EU, its values must 
also have reflected this as new treaties has amended or replaced the old ones.  
If one takes a look at the beginning of the EU with the European Steel and Coal 
Community (ECSC) from 1952 and start looking for declarations of adherence to a set 
of values, then it is hard to find. However, there is a statement of intent in Article 2 of 
the treaty, stating that,  
“The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as 
its task to contribute, in harmony with the general 
economy of the Member States and through the 
establishment of a common market as provided in Article 
4, to economic expansion, growth of employment and a 
rising standard of living in the Member States.” (ECSC, 
Article 2) 
This clearly gives the ECSC the nature of an economic Union. The continuation of 
article 2 should be viewed while considering the historical period of its introduction.  
“The community shall progressively bring about 
conditions which will of themselves ensure the most 
rational distribution of production at the highest possible 
level of productivity, while safeguarding continuity of 
employment and taking care not to provoke fundamental 
and persistent disturbances on the economies of Member 
States”(ECSC, Article 2) 
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Although not explicitly stated, it could be argued that the above statement is an 
indicator that the EU is a capitalist liberal regime (as opposed to Communism), giving it 
a role in the Cold War. Even though there isn't any articles concerning the values of the 
ECSC there is an article explaining what it should promote, which include  
“improved standards of living for the workers of the 
industries for which it is responsible, so as to make 
possible their harmonisation while the improvement is 
being maintained” (ECSC, Article 3(e)) 
Jumping forth in time from the Paris treaty to the Rome treaty, which is the next 
comprehensive treaty. With the Rome treaty of 1958 the name of the European Steel 
and Coal Community changed to the European Economic Community (EEC), a name 
that if nothing else can be seen a clear tool of myth creation on the Community. There is 
still no explicit statement of which values the EEC endorse or on which principles it is 
founded, and like the ECSC it is forward looking, clearly stating what it wish to achieve 
in its Article 2. 
“The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a 
common market and progressively approximating the 
economic policies of Member States, to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of 
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, 
and increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the 
standard of living and closer relations between the States 
belonging to it” (EEC Article 2) 
The EEC is still mainly focused on the economic side of the Community and raising the 
living standard of its inhabitants through a common market and a drive to harmonise the 
economies of the Member States. The closest the Community come to value given 
rights as seen in the later EU, is derived through the provisions of the common market 
as a freedom of movement contained in Article 48(1) and 48(2) 
“Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured 
within the Community...Such freedom of movement entail 
the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality 
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between workers of the Member States as regards 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work 
and employment.” (EEC Article 48(1)(2)) 
The next big change in the purpose of the EU values came with the Maastricht treaties 
in 1993. In 1993, two treaties were put into force, one that amended the previous 
treaties (Treaty establishing the European Communities – Maastricht EC) as well as a 
new Treaty on European Union (Maastricht EU). The Maastricht EC treaty was largely 
a continuation of the old treaties:  
“The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a 
common market and an economic and monetary union and 
by implementing the common policies or activities referred 
to in Article 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious and balanced development of 
economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary 
growth, respecting the environment, a high degree of 
convergence of economic performance, a high level of 
employment and of social protection, the raising of the 
standard of living and quality of life, and economic and 
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States” 
(Maastricht EC Article 2)  
Although the treaty retain the old provisions of intent; common market, higher standard 
of living and harmonised economies, it also sport new value added statements. 
Respecting the environment, quality of life and social protection all add new dimensions 
to the European Union, while the mentioning of social cohesion and solidarity amongst 
Member States offers a redistributive element. Moving on to the Maastricht EU treaty, it 
establish itself as  
“a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are 
taken as closely as possible to the citizen.” (Maastricht EU 
Article A) 
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This signifies that the new Union has an increased focus on democracy, while its second 
article list the objectives of the Union, which amongst others include: 
“-to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of 
the nationals of its Member States through the introduction 
of a citizenship of the Union” (Maastricht EU Article B) 
The rights conferred upon the citizens by their EU citizenship, is contained in 
Maastricht Article 8 EU (with subarticles), and mainly confer the right of free 
movement as in the EEC Article 48, and thus a part of the free movement of the means 
of production. Maastricht Article also contains which economic initiatives the 
Community should undertake: 
“- to promote economic and social progress which is 
balanced and sustainable, in particular through the 
creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the 
strengthening of economic and social cohesion and 
through the establishment of economic and monetary 
union, ultimately including a single currency in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty” (Maastricht 
Article B)  
Thus, the euro is introduced into the treaty base. Additionally the Maastricht EU treaty 
Article F provide its citizens with additional rights based on those already common to 
the Member State courts; 
“The Union shall respect fundamental rights...as they 
result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, as general principles of Community law” 
(Maastricht EU Article F) 
Thereby writing in the human rights in the EU, while at the same time conceding that 
the Human rights have always been part of the juridical makeup of the Member States.  
The Amsterdam treaties that went into force in 1999 amends the Maastricht treaties, 
retaining much of the old language. There are however two major developments in 
Value Articles. Article 2 of the Amsterdam Treaty Establishing the European 
Communities (Amsterdam EC) adds  
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“to promote...equality between men and woman...and...a 
high level of protection and improvement of the quality of 
the environment” (Amsterdam EC Article 2)  
Thus emphasising both the environment and more rights. Meanwhile the Maastricht EU 
Article F has been amended into Amsterdam EU Article 6 with the following important 
addition: 
“The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are 
common to the Member States” (Amsterdam EU Article 6) 
This is the first actual Value Article in the EU that explicitly states which values the EU 
is founded upon. It is worth noting that the values are presented as if they were already 
there but just needed to be written down.  
When the Nice treaties went in to force in 2003, it did not change any of the Value 
Articles in either of the two treaties, but instead prepared the Union for the great East 
expansion. The next treaty of interest is the latest ones - the Lisbon Treaties, which went 
into force in 2009. With the Lisbon treaty, the name of the treaties changed from the 
Treaty Establishing the European Communities into the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) while the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) remained 
the same. The Article 2 of the TEU provides a full Value Article dedicated to the 
explicit values of the EU, based on the Amsterdam EU Article 6: 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail.” (TEU Article 2) 
This article summarise many of the values already scattered around in the other treaties, 
while also including new ones; respect for human dignity and freedom, while it 
emphasise that rights also is given to minorities and that the EU Member States 
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naturally have pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men. It should be noted that although many of the listed concepts 
were included in previous treaties this is the first time it is called values. The aim of the 
Union is now moved to Article 3 where peace, the Union values, and well-being of its 
people are singled out. Note that Peace is not a value in itself here, but something the 
EU aims to promote. There is also an emphasis on combating inequality in the TFEU, 
where Article 8 concerns equality: 
“in all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate 
inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and 
women”(TFEU Article 8) 
The economic aims of the Union is maintained in TEU Article 3(3), where it goes with 
the same themes as in previous treaties, but now with an added emphasis on 
discrimination and solidarity between workers, and a note that:  
“It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, 
and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is 
safeguarded and enhanced.” (TEU Article 3(3)) 
Once again mentioning the protection of minority cultures. 
Over the course of EU history, no value seem to have disappeared, although the 
economic rhetoric has been significantly downplayed, while rights and soft values has 
been emphasised, and recently the emphasis on minority protection has increased 
significantly. 
Based on these findings, it would seem that while the newer treaties contain the older 
values, also they include new ones, and defiantly new emphasises, that would be 
important to include in the analysis of how the contemporary Union legitimise itself. 
Therefore, the next step in deciding which values and Articles that shall form the basis 
for choosing which Court Cases to investigate is to go further only with the Lisbon 
treaty, in the next section.  
The overall direction of the EU has gone from an exclusive focus on the economic aims 
of the Union, to a realisation that there is a common set of values shared by the Member 
States that needed to be articulated. This development show an increased need for an 
outspoken essence in the European Project – something that makes it possible for 
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European Countries to work together, and, sets the cultural borders of Europe just 
outside of Turkey (Redmund, 2007).  
 
6.2 EU Myths and Values 
Now that I have assured myself that only court cases based on the Lisbon Treaty should 
be analysed, it is time to go more in depth in that treaty.  
This start with a small discussion on why it is not enough to merely look at Article 2 of 
the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (TEU), where it is clearly stated which values the 
EU is founded upon. It is also necessary to look at the rest of the two first TITLES of 
the TEU as well as the second TITLE and Part TWO of the Lisbon Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The rest of the TEU TITLE I and II are the 
general provisions for what the EU stands for, while TITLE II and Part TWO of the 
TFEU describe how certain values should be upheld within the institutional setup and 
policy development of the EU. The next item to be discussed is the 'Institutional Ethos' 
or 'Normative basis' of the EU. 
The Value Articles of the EU create what Andrew Williams calls an Institutional Ethos, 
which means the  
“collective disposition, character and fundamental values 
that capture the existent sense of the EU as an institution 
in terms of both particular formally constructed 
arrangements and its 'general pattern of activity'.” 
(Williams, 2010: 10)  
Like any long standing institution, the EU has over the years had an institutional ethos 
emerge and evolve as subtle changes such as decisions, practices and the surrounding 
world has changed, be it in a political, legal, social or economic development. The 
institutional ethos loosely structures and guides what is acceptable, setting parameters 
through both formal and informal rules and norms for such changes to be absorbed by 
the institutions. It also helps determine what the institution does or does not recognise as 
appropriate behaviour and preferences. (Williams, 2010: 11)  
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Regarding the Institutional ethos, then Williams has an altogether negative view of how 
the European Courts is currently handling so many different principles in the treaty. The 
main critique being that with so many principles, the overall picture is that there is no 
coherence and moral purpose for the Courts to follow, which has resulted in a state were 
the Court rule is based on interpretation of original political will rather than in a theory 
of justice (Williams, 2010: 18).  
At the other end of the scale Ian Manners, has discussed what he calls the EU's 
'normative basis' (Manners, 20002: 243). The EU's normative basis is unlike the 
institutional ethos, based on the EU's normative intend – currently achievable or not – 
instead of an at times random historical formation of what to do.  
Both theorists has identified similar values as the most important for the Union: Liberty, 
democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, with Williams also underpinning 
peace, while Manners stress the treaty base in Article 6 TEU (on fundamental rights). 
While both theorist describe the Values of the EU from different points of view - either 
from the point of view that the EU need to evolve beyond its beginnings and create a 
more justice based set of coherent values - or from the point of view that the EU has 
stated what it intend is, they both neglect the economic values embedded in the treaty 
base from the beginning of the EU. While it could seem from a contemporary look at 
the EU that only the values stated by Williams or Manners, are currently important to 
the EU, I would beg to differ. By their own definitions, the EU is more than its stated 
values. There is a structural dimension in the EU as an institution that does not have to 
be directly stated as a value to have the legal-interpretive effect of being one.  
Moving on, the next item of business is the analysis of the first two sections of the TEU 
named TITLE I Common Provisions and TITLE II Provisions on Democratic Principals 
and the two parts of the TFEU named TITLE II Provisions Having General Application 
and Part Two Non-Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union, as these combined 
contain the Institutional Ethos of the EU.
7
  
The analysis will be conducted by going through each of the Articles included in these 
sections of the TEU and TFEU, and then identify values, aims and goals of the Union 
                                                          
7
 The rest of the TITLEs are Technical Provisions on how the EU Member States and Institutions should 
work. 
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and subsequently decide if they are part of any of the three Political Myths that I have 
chosen to investigate, or falls outside of their categories.  
 
TEU Article 1: Although the first article indirectly mentions democracy and good 
governance as values that the EU will be built upon in the choice of the words “...in 
which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as close as possible to the citizen.” 
(TEU Article 1, italics added by me) None of those principles are however closely 
linked to any of the Political Myths. 
 
TEU Article 2: This is the main value article and thus contain many values and 
principles:  
“respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities.” (TEU Article 
2)   
…while the text continues with principles that, if not encourage a culturally divided 
Europe, then at least recognise it with the word “pluralism” and condone it provided 
that certain minimum standards such as “non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, and 
equality between women and men” is upheld while reminding us that all of the Member 
States need to work together by adding “solidarity” as a principle. With the strong 
emphasis on minority protection equality and respect for human rights, Article two has 
many values and principles that go towards a social political myth, while the other 
myths are not represented at all. 
 
TEU Article 3: This article takes up strokes from all three political myths. Within its 5 
sub articles, it provide the EU with a drive to promote a multitude of values amongst 
which I assess that the promotion of eradication of poverty and the protection of human 
rights, in particular the rights of the child is all as part of a social political myth. Further 
down in the article both the economic and environmental myths has principles and 
values tied to them. The internal market, the economic and monetary union and the 
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promotion of free and fair trade in the wider world goes towards the economic myth 
while a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment and 
sustainable development of the Earth goes towards the environmental myth. Besides 
these values and principles, the article also in general support cultural diversity and 
peaceful respect of people who are different from one self. 
 
TEU Article 4: This article does not contain any values or principles that are part of the 
chosen political myths – the article mainly gives EU a range of competences while 
establishing that the Member States has only competences that are not transferred to the 
Union, while obligating Member States to follow the Treaties. 
 
TEU Article 5: Article 5 confers the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality upon 
the EU which is both democratic tools that ensure that decisions and problem solving 
are done at the appropriate level, it does not however contain any values or principles 
linked to political myths. 
 
TEU Article 6: This article applies rights regimes to the EU and thus the social political 
myth. The regimes mentioned are the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, although the article explicitly states that the EU does not 
change its competences to act based on these regimes, and that they should already be 
part of the common traditions of the Member States. 
 
TEU Article 7: This article provides the legal base for disciplinary action against a 
Member State that make a “serious and persistent breach” of the values mentioned in 
article 2. Thus, this article is important for how the EU is enforcing values, and 
therefore indirectly linked to the social myth via article 2. If any social values are 
violated and subsequently tried with this article, it would constitute a very strong 
motion for the social political myth, as this article is a very strong political signal. 
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TEU Article 8: This article helps establish the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
confer the values of the EU into policies with neighbouring countries. 
 
TEU Article 9: This article confers a citizenship of the Union onto any resident of the 
EU, and informs the institutions of the EU that all citizens should have equal access to 
its activities. While the citizenship grants rights to the citizens, those rights are political 
in nature and not part of a political myth. 
 
TEU Article 10: This article confers the principles of representative democracy onto 
the EU. As such, it is not directly part of the political myths.  
 
TEU Article 11: This article does not directly confer any political myths, however the 
increased possibility of political Voice from minorities, does bring democratic minority 
protection into the sphere of a social political myth.  
 
TEU Article 12: This article applies general principles of good governance to the EU, 
and is thus not part of any of the chosen political myths. 
 
TFEU Article 7: This article states that the Union should have consistency between its 
policies and activities, and does not contain anything relevant for political myths. 
 
TFEU Article 8: This article confers the activities of the EU with eliminating 
inequalities and the promotion of equality, between men and women, and is thus a part 
of the social political myth. 
 
TFEU Article 9: This article has both elements that confer to the social and economic 
myths. It states that the EU should promote high levels of employment in the 
implementation of its activities and policies, which is an economic principle, while it 
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also confer social protection, protection of human health and to fight against social 
exclusion as part of the social myth. While the promotion of high levels of education is 
not a part of the social myth before it become a policy that actively create social 
mobility through its policies (such as the Danish SU system). 
 
TFEU Article 10: Once again, the EU explicitly states that it aims to combat a wide 
variety of discrimination, which is a clear part of the social political myth.  
 
TFEU Article 11: This article states that EU activities and policies should include 
Environmental protection requirements, with an emphasis on sustainable development. 
This sets this article in the environmental political myth. 
 
TFEU Article 12: This article confers consumer protection into the policies and 
activities of the EU. This is part of the social political myth, as it is a protection of the 
citizens of the EU against an unregulated internal market.  
 
TFEU Article 13: This article is difficult to place in a specific category. While it is a 
protection of livestock, it does not have any environmental perspectives, only the 
welfare of the animals, while it at the same time states that respecting religious rites, 
culture, and regional heritage are more important than the welfare of animals (I assume 
to a certain degree). This article will be included in the research, not as part of the 
political myths, but because arguments used in a court case based on this article might 
give extensive rights to cultural minorities. 
 
TFEU Article 14: This article compels both the EU and its Member States on all levels 
of cooperation to ensure that services of general economic interest to be regulated 
funded and provided in accordance with the European Parliament and the Council to 
such a degree that they can fulfil their missions. In other words, this article provide that 
the EU ensure that the financial system of the EU function properly. This article is a 
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part of the economic political myth, as it provides the EU with the legal basis to ensure 
that the core institutions for a liberal economy are upheld.  
TFEU Article 15: This article promotes principles of a transparent bureaucracy and 
thus promotes good governance and democratic principles, while not being of interest to 
the selected political myths. 
 
TFEU Article 16: This article applies the protection of personal data as a right to 
everyone. Note that this is written in as a universal rule and are not provided by 
citizenship or other such rights providers. As a part of the consumer protection regime, 
this article is part of the social political myth. 
 
TFEU Article 17: This article provide the Union with equal respect to all religious 
communities within the EU, as well as philosophical and non-confessional 
communities, while providing that the EU should recognise both their identity and their 
specific contributions. This article does not come under the heading of any political 
myth. Although it recognises minorities, it does not provide these minorities with more 
protection than it does to any other community or group. 
 
TFEU Article 18: This article provide equal treatment based on nationality, while 
providing the European Parliament and Council the legal basis to combat such 
discrimination, thus putting this article as part of the social political myth. 
 
TFEU Article 19: This article provides means for combating discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. This article also confers a legal basis to the European Parliament and 
Council to combat such discrimination and is like TFEU Article 18 a part of the social 
political myth. 
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TFEU Article 20: This article provides the legal basis for the Citizenship of the Union. 
It states the political rights of a citizen who lives outside their own country, as well as 
the right to move freely within the Member States, under the limitations of the 
subsequent articles, 21-24 as this article summarize the next four and they have the 
same focus, they will be address together. The rights conferred by the citizenship do not 
have any perspectives of the chosen political myths. They do however provide grounds 
for the myth that the EU resembles a federation more and more. Due to these 
circumstances, articles 20 through 24 are not part of the social political myth although 
they refer to the right of free movement, which is a result of increased cooperation and 
not as a result of consumer or minority protection, or any other part of the social 
political myth. 
 
TFEU Article 25: This article provide that the Commission should review Part Two of 
the TFEU once every three years and give the power to add more rights to the 
citizenship of the EU. As such, it does not provide the legal basis for any of the chosen 
political myths. 
 
The actual search for court cases can now begin. The search is based on the above 
findings and summarized in Table 6.1 of Appendix A. A search through the EU case 
law database infocuria
8
, while only accepting cases from the TEU and TFEU that refer 
to articles that is part of a political myth (summarized Table 6.1, Appendix A), which 
are closed and processed by the ECJ only, I get the results presented in Table 6.2 in 
Appendix B.
9 
When clearing the numbers from Table 6.2 there is 65 unique cases. From here, the next 
step is to analyse which, if any, set of values has been favoured in each court case, how 
important each case is in policy and political myth creation and if there is a coherent 
pattern of favouritism of one set of values over another set of values. 
 
                                                          
8
 http://curia.europa.eu 
9
 Searched on the 3rd of February 2012 
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7 Going to Court 
In this chapter, the court cases that I have found in the previous chapter will be 
analysed. The analysis is split into two main phases. First, the court cases will be 
analysed statistically, by reading through them and by discretionary assessment decided 
which myths each court case favour and which they overrule. The statistical exposition 
of the court cases will be the basis for assessing if any general pattern for political 
myths has emerged. In the second part of the analysis, court cases that are interesting 
will be singled out and discussed in detail on how they establish the political myths. 
 During the course of reading through the court cases, I have become aware that there is 
a fourth myth that both constitute a set of values in itself and has enough power to 
influence the legitimacy of some EU undertakings. This has been identified as a 
democratic myth and will be established through court cases in this chapter, while the 
essence of the myth will be explored further in the next chapter. Finally, first hypothesis 
stated in the methodical chapter, will be answered at the end of this chapter. 
 
7.1 Statistical Analysis 
In the previous chapter, it were concluded which court cases should form the empirical 
basis for investigating how political myths are established through the ECJ. The 
quantitative analysis of these 65 court cases is summarised in Appendix C. The 
processing of data in Appendix C is based on the research strategy described in chapter 
3 and only offer a quick overview of which political myths is favoured and which is 
overruled, as well as stating which kind of argument has been used to reach the verdict. 
The summary in Appendix C is not only based on the actual judgements in the court 
cases. There is a whole range of documents attached to each individual case, all of 
which potentially bears useful information. The procedure for classifying the rulings in 
Appendix C, has been to read through both the judgements, the advocate general’s 
opinion, and when necessary the summary of the judgement. The reason for this 
procedure is that while the judgement and judgement summary (which is reserved for 
the most comprehensive cases) do argue and refer to primary law, secondary law and 3
rd
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party legislation (such as the ECHR), then it is in the advocate general’s opinion that all 
considerations are explored, and there that the opinions and judicial negotiations 
between Member States are obtained. 
 As there are too many cases to write in detail about each one of them, here are some 
comments on the criteria for determining how a court case is associated with political 
myth. One of the considerations that were taken during the analysis was that I had to 
think from a myth perspective what the function of each court case was. For example 
can a matter of free movement have an economic outcome in one case while it is a 
matter of social rights in another, and while market regulation can strengthen the 
economic myth in one case, it can lessen the economic myth in another. Also, it has 
been important not to look at who won a case but whose argument it strengthens.  
There are cases in which the EU for one reason or another has been unable to fine 
companies for exploiting their dominant positions or been unable to fine companies for 
forming a cartel.  
In these types of cases I have noted it down as a loss to the economic myth although it 
could have secured the companies a higher profit, because the opposite ruling would be 
a reason to have the EU as a protector of the consumer by creating a 'free and fair' 
liberal market economy, which is the goal of the economic EU.  
It is mainly in the economic sphere that I have made these kind of backwards 
assessments, although there is a single other case in Scarlet Extended where I have 
made a similar assessment with the social myth. Although Scarlet Extended overrule an 
established right of intellectual property, I have deemed that this right is perceived as 
part of the economic myth rather than the rights based social myth.  
These thoughts aside, it is now time for to account for what information the statistical 
data yield. The first observation is that the clear majority of cases concern the social 
political myth in one form or another. Of these, there are six instances where the social 
myth has been strengthened while the economic myth has been lessened. These cases 
are split into two categories, one where the free market is restrained for the benefit of 
fundamental freedoms or rights, and the other category is where consumers or workers 
are given rights that limit the economic scope of sellers or employers. In one additional 
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case that was ruled to be inadmissible, the court nonetheless still provided the legal 
arguments for why it is legal to have extraordinary high duties on tobacco. 
Besides the six cases where the economic myth is overruled, there are twenty cases that 
benefit the social myth without overruling other cases. Most of these cases are 
clarifications of social rights principles, usually with the outcome that they also work in 
the given case and that national legislation cannot change these rules. Many of this type 
of cases concerns discrimination in pension funds and schemes, where it has previously 
been customary to set premiums and payments based on the sex of the customer.  
And last in the social rights sphere there are two cases where the social myth has been 
overruled without benefiting another myth. One of the cases let the national court decide 
which crimes are deemed significant enough to expel a national citizen. Although not in 
itself overruling citizens’ rights, a harmonisation of rights would have increased the 
social myth. The other case establishes that 3
rd
 national citizens have fewer rights in 
court than EU and national citizens. 
There are seven cases that strengthen the economic myth, but only one of these cases 
overrules another myth. In the specific case the bargaining right of public workers is 
determined to still be subject to be put out to tender in all EU countries, if the pension 
becomes mandatory. In the other court cases regarding the economic myth, the main 
focal point is securing a free market by combating price fixing, for dominant companies 
to exploit their position and general harmonization of markets. It is for the same reasons 
that two cases were noted down as the economic myth being overruled, as it failed to 
combat cartels due to a lack of evidence. 
One of the things that really stand out in Appendix C is that there is only one case that 
even concerns the environment. This is not to be construed as the EU not caring about 
the environment at all, but it can be interpreted as there being a lack of principle cases. 
The one case there is, is on the other hand very principle, both for the environment and 
for how the EU generally establish a common principle. Suffice to say here is that the 
environmental political myth is taken serious by the ECJ, while the details of the case 
will be discussed further in the qualitative analysis later in this thesis.  
The remainder of the court cases does not take a direct stance in the political myths, but 
they still affect them nonetheless. There are sixteen cases that for one reason or another 
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does not commit itself to any myth, either because they simply concerns other matters, 
such as nations failing to fulfil its responsibilities by disregarding previous ECJ rulings, 
or because the myths involved in the court case keep a status quo after the ruling. In the 
latter category there is for example case C-400/10 that determine the right of the father 
against the right of the mother in cases about custody of the child. In any outcome of 
this case, one set of social rights has been favored over another set of social rights, in 
this case that the father of a child will need a court judgment to gain custody of a child 
and thus preventing the mother and child from moving to another EU country, while the 
mother has an automatic right to her child.  
Besides cases without political myth gains or losses there is also thirteen cases that has 
been ruled inadmissible. These thirteen cases are split into two broad categories. Two 
cases were deemed too unclear in their reference for ruling, while ten of the cases called 
for the ECJ to act as a high court in internal national matters (mainly on corruption and 
the rule of law), or as a protector of fundamental or human rights for the citizens against 
their own state.  
The combined statistical data above show that while the social political myth feature 
quite prominently, then there is a limited number of cases that establish the social myth 
as hierarchically above the economic myth (7 cases) and not much information has been 
gained about the environmental myth. The social myth is quite consistent in abolishing 
discrimination, while the economic myth consistently combats 'bad' market behaviour. 
In the overlap between the economic and social spheres, the social myth is consistently 
favoured, on the grounds that the market either diminish some form of right, or that it is 
more important to regulate human health than to have an unregulated market 
Besides the established political myths, it would seem as if the continued calls for the 
ECJ as a kind of supranational ombudsman give evidence to the notion that there is an 
additional political myth. Although it has evidently not established itself as a legal 
principle, it still has an influence on how the people of Europe view the legitimacy of 
the EU. I will return to establishing this 4
th
 myth later in this chapter. But first, I need to 
take a closer look on the most principle of the court cases, as well as a closer look at the 
cases that establish the 4
th
 myth. 
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7.2 Qualitative Analysis 
As the cases that best establish the internal order of the political myths from the point of 
view of the ECJ is being analysed, it has to first be established that the economy is and 
has always been the backdrop and baseline that all other considerations in regard to the 
EU need to be measured against. The EU started as an economic institution as in chapter 
4 of this paper, and since then, even the first integration project between states in 1958, 
neo-functionalism, had the free economy as its basis. A notion that was renewed with 
the Single European Act and the introduction of the Euro. So even though the economic 
political myth appear as weak when you only look at the few court cases presented here, 
then it is still the myth that others will be measured against from the logic that if left 
unchallenged (which it is here through court cases), the free economy would be the rule 
rather than the court established exception. 
While keeping this in mind the first item to be analysed is the single environmental case 
C-366/10 - The Air Transport Association of America and Others. In addition to being 
the only case featuring the environment, then C-366/10 - The Air Transport Association 
of America and Others is also the case where the ECJ has reinterpreted and rethought 
the judicial principles of the EU the most. The case itself concerns the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme (the outcome of the Kyoto protocol in the EU) and the 
international rules for flight fuel. The basis is that all Member States of the EU has 
previously agreed to exempt fuel for international flights from any form of extra taxes 
or duties in the Open Skies Agreement. At the same time, the Emissions Trading 
Scheme put a tax on the emissions that result from using flight fuel, which in essence 
become a tax on the length of each individual flight. Aviation has been exempt from the 
emission tax until 2012.  
The court case is a preliminary ruling on the validity of the Directive that governs the 
Emissions Trading Scheme. The interesting in this case is not only that the EU has 
decided that the environment is more important than cheaper commercial flights, but the 
arguments behind the decision. The ECJ argue that the EU directive is valid because the 
EU as an institution has not joined the Open Skies Agreement and that despite all 
Member States having agreed to the Open Skies Agreement, it does not constitute a 
principle of European law.  
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In contrast to this decision, there is case C-144/04 Mangold wherein the ECJ decided 
that a principle for non-discrimination in the ILO conventions that not all Member 
States had signed, which did not specifically mention age as a ground for non-
discrimination, nonetheless established that age could not be the grounds for 
discrimination. The argument being that it was already an established general principle 
of the EU Member States (Roseberry, 2010: 214). The fact that the ECJ has decided the 
Open Skies Agreement not to be a general principle of the Member States serve to show 
that the ECJ is ready to protect its environmental policies, as not doing so would have 
been an equally valid decision by the court, but would have been easier to defend in the 
international community. 
Moving on, the three cases C-137/09 – Josemans, C-267/10 - Rossius and Collard and 
C-70/10 - Scarlet Extended has some similar attributes to C-366/10 - The Air Transport 
Association of America and Others, in that they constitute a question of what weights 
heavier than market considerations. In the three cases Josemans, Rossius and Collard 
and Scarlet Extended, the ECJ does not question that the dispute regards how important 
a free market is in comparison to combating drugs, public health, and privacy 
respectively. In all three cases the market were deemed to be less important.  
In Josemans the question is if Holland may discriminate between who it is legal to sell 
Marijuana to in coffee shops. This makes it partly a question of social rights, in which it 
is ruled that an effort to secure public health weighs heavier than both a free market and 
non-discrimination.  
While in Rossius and Collard the court states that it is incompetent to make a judgement 
on whether Belgium may collect excise taxes on cigarettes due to health reasons, while 
it nonetheless still states that excise taxes on tobacco is legal, even though it was not 
obligated to make such a statement.  
The Scarlet Extended has lately become part of a series of cases that can effectively 
alter the public view on whether the EU is a protector of the market or a protector of 
civil rights. Scarlet Extended concerns whether ISP providers can be forced to secure 
that no copyrighted material be transferred illegally through their internet connection. 
Within the last few months, there has been a public movement for a free internet that 
started with the American PIPA and SOPA laws. The attack on internet freedom has so 
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far spawned worldwide demonstrations against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) that were ratified by a majority of EU Member States recently.  
The court case 360/10 – Sabam, which were judged after the deadline for the cases 
chosen for the quantitative part of this analysis, along with Scarlet Extended has so far 
provided that neither ISP providers nor online platforms that provide users with the 
possibility to upload music and video can be required to filter its content for 
copyrighted material on a general basis for an unlimited period of time.  
The most recent development is that the validity of ACTA has been referred to the ECJ, 
to test if it is in compliance with EU law. The ECJ itself has admitted as part of previous 
court cases on the same subject that the dispute is that  
“the protection of the fundamental right to property, which 
includes the rights linked to intellectual property, must be 
balanced against the protection of other fundamental 
rights” (360/10 – Sabam line 42).  
Considering the public attention that internet privacy and piracy generate then these 
combined cases has proven to be important myth creators that sets the EU as a protector 
of digital and privacy rights.  
The importance of privacy in the EU is further underpinned by the case C-92/09 - 
Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, in which it is decided that takers of agricultural 
aid from the EU is not required for transparency reasons, to divulge personal data and 
size of aid in a public forum. This constitutes privacy and private information as more 
important than both rights to intellectual property and transparency in particular, 
corresponding to the market and accountable democracy in principle. 
The next subject is also rights based. There is a collection of cases in Appendix C where 
the applicant calls for the ECJ to act as an ombudsman in regards to fair trials and the 
upholding of fundamental and human rights in the applicants home State. The ECJ has 
ruled all of these cases as inadmissible on the grounds of non-competence. Although the 
ECJ has ruled itself incompetent then the number of cases referenced on these grounds 
is interesting from a political myth point of view.  
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All of these cases come from either Eastern Europe, Southern Europe or from Belgium. 
Seen as a political myth it is interesting that besides Belgium, these cases come from a 
range of countries that were under authoritarian rule before they joined the EU, while 
the cases originating from Belgium have come while there has been no democratic 
elected government in control of the country. It is also evident from Appendix C that 
these cases have been increasing in number since the signing of the Lisbon treaty. This 
begs the question of whether the Lisbon treaty has encouraged a new political myth to 
emerge. While it is not evident in the ECJ then there has been an increased rhetoric 
regarding the values of rule of law and democracy in the external policies of the EU, 
namely the enlargement and the European Neighbourhood policy.
10
 While the court 
cases themselves cannot provide more information on this subject, this 4
th
 myth will be 
explored further in the next chapter of this thesis. 
The final cluster of cases that I would like to address are related to the new status of 
fundamental and human rights after the Lisbon treaty conferred the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union with the same legal value as the Treaty on 
the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In the 
three cases C-57/09 – B and D, C-465/07 – Elgafaji, and C-411/10 - N. S. the rights of 
refugee asylum seekers has been greatly improved.  
Combined the three cases establish that even members of terrorist organisations cannot 
be denied asylum on the grounds that they pose a significant risk of public safety unless 
it can be proved that they have committed an act of violence, and that a refugee can 
claim risk of serious harm even though there are no evidence that the refugee is 
personally targeted for harm. The interesting in those cases is that they are established 
in opposition to national rules that would previously have prohibited the refugees from 
entering the EU. In that context, it poses a significant boost to the social rights political 
myths. 
 
 
                                                          
10 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm EU action plans for the ENP 
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7.3 The Larger Picture 
The final points to consider in this chapter are whether the court cases has established 
political myths through its rulings, if an internal hierarchy between those myths exist 
and whether the ECJ rule consistently.  
While considering the findings in Appendix C it becomes apparent that while there is an 
economic political myth in the EU and that the premise of free trade is a consideration 
of the ECJ, it is obvious that the ECJ consistently rule social rights and human health to 
be more important. Although it could be argued that the majority of economic cases 
would not use the Articles that have been provided as a basis for review, then principle 
cases containing references to social rights are ruled on the basis of the chosen articles.  
It is more uncertain with the environmental myth, as a single case is not enough to see 
any pattern. The one case that does consider the environment is very principle in nature, 
and shows that the EU is willing to go against an established international regime in 
order to protect the environment. What can be established with certainty is that, the ECJ 
consistently support the Economic political myth over national rules that hinder the 
market, while the ECJ likewise consistently support a social rights political myth as 
being more important than the economic political myth, thus establishing an internal 
hierarchy between these two myths. With regards to the environmental myth, then the 
lack of cases renders the research inconclusive. Additionally, if there is a democracy 
based political myth, then the ECJ has deemed itself incompetent to rule.  
As stated previously in this thesis, then the EU were founded as an Economic entity, 
and one of the oldest goals of the Union has been to  
“have as its task to contribute… to economic expansion, 
growth of employment and a rising standard of living in 
the Member States.” (ECSC, Article 2) 
Therefore, it is very surprising that the analysis of court cases show that the ECJ rule 
consistently in favour of social rights over a free economy.  
There is however a possible explanation to the surprising conclusion provided by this 
analysis. In chapter 3.1, the validity of this thesis is brought into question on the 
grounds that the selection of which articles to analyse favours very broad and value 
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laden articles. As the economy is much better integrated into the EU, it also has much 
more detailed and technical laws attached to it. This means that many articles 
concerning the Economic Political Myth, is not included in the analysis. A similar 
critique can be aimed at the fact that only court cases that refer to a limited part of the 
primary legislation has been included. And last, the lack of court cases that favour the 
economic myth over the social myth could also be referred to the possibility that they 
have already been subject to a court case before the time-demarcation of this thesis, 
which the Lisbon Treaty is.  
However, these observations cannot entirely dismiss the result. It is correct that the 
delimitation in the choice of court cases mean that court cases based on legislation 
earlier than the Lisbon Treaty, and court cases that does not refer to the stated principles 
of the EU, are not included in the analysis.  
It is explained in chapter 3 that ontology has purposely been demarcated at the Lisbon 
Treaty to only contain the contemporary principles of the EU. This means that while the 
analysis cannot provide a full image of the EU, it can still account for recent tendencies 
in the EU. As a defence for the fact, that only a limited type of Articles has been as the 
basis for court cases, then it is correct that not all cases concerning the economy is 
included, but cases concerning social rights are included. While it is possible to 
formulate questions referred to the ECJ about the free internal market in such a manner 
that it does not need to refer to any of the selected type of articles, then those cases 
would be precluded questions associated with social rights. Thus, those cases would not 
affect the social political myth, as that myth is neither suppressed nor expressed. 
With some reservations, it is possible to accept that conclusion that social rights are 
favoured over a free economy in the ECJ:  
As long as the premise that the explanatory force of the analysis is limited to post 
Lisbon Treaty EU is accepted, then it can be concluded that there has been a tendency in 
the ECJ to favour social rights over a free market, when the ECJ has been given the 
opportunity to evaluate which stated principles should be prevalent in the EU.  
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8 What the EU is. And what it can do. 
Now that it has been considered how rulings in court cases has constituted a hierarchy 
between political myths, it is time to investigate how the legitimacy of the ECJ or the 
EU is currently changing as a result of how the EU is handling three high profile policy 
issues.  
1 ) The violation of the acquis communautaire in Hungary.  
2 ) The balancing of intellectual property rights and the right to privacy on the internet, 
and… 
3 ) The European economic crisis.  
Before these cases are discussed the right political myth setting for discussing the 
violation of the acquis communautaire in Hungary need to be established. This leads to 
the additional 4
th
 myth that was discovered in the previous chapter. 
 
8.1 The Democratic Europe 
In chapter 7 of this thesis, it was described that there were a number of court cases 
concerning democracy and the rule of law, which were however dismissed by the court 
on the grounds of inadmissibility. The reason that this tendency can be seen as the 
outcome of a myth in its own right (and not as an outcome of the social myth), are tied 
to the kind of countries these cases come from. Disregarding the cases coming from 
Belgium, which have its own reasons for asking the ECJ to act as a ruling body
11
, then it 
has been Eastern and Southern European countries where citizens has asked for the ECJ 
to act as an ombudsman. Historically, both the southern and eastern enlargement of 
Europe has been a process ensuring democracy in countries that previously had 
authoritarian regimes as well as a reunification process.  
When one look at the history of EU value articles in chapter 6.1, then it is no 
coincidence that the first emphasis on democracy come with the Maastricht treaty, the 
                                                          
11
 The Belgium state has been unstable from 2007 till 2011 with long periods without an official 
government.  
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first major treaty revision after the fall of the Soviet Union, while the full articulation of 
the EU being founded on democracy comes with the Amsterdam treaty.  
This tells us that the emergence of the 4th myth comes as a result of the EU wanting to 
signify its political difference from the Soviet Union as well as creating a political 
marker in addition to a geographical marker for which countries that can join the EU. 
Although the EU has articulated democracy and the rule of law as always being the 
foundation of the EU but just needed to be stated as such, then internal policies that 
guarantees democracy and the rule of law for citizens has never been implemented. 
However, the role of especially the rule of law and the promotion of democracy play a 
great part in the external policy of the EU, which primarily address potential Member 
States and partners in the European Neighbourhood Policy, thus informing those states 
that democracy and the rule of law are pillars of the EU.
 12
  
This is in itself not a problem – democracy and the rule of law are after all considered 
universally good values by the EU. The problem is that, at least until recently, the EU 
does not apply the same pressure to respect these values on Member States as it does for 
would be Member States or external policy partners (Niemann and de Wekker, 2010: 
15-16). As mentioned above the EU has not implemented any instruments to ensure 
internal policies, while the EU uses conditionality as part of its external policy.  
 
8.2 Political Cases 
Recently there has however been a new development in the EU.  In 2011, a new 
constitution for Hungary went into force that amongst other things, limited the 
independence of the media, limited the independence of the Hungarian central bank, and 
undermine the judiciary independence of the Hungarian court. The media law meant 
that anyone could file a complaint about a news outlet for being biased and if found 
guilty pay a fine up to € 700.000.13 A government settled Media Council is to impose 
the fines, as well as appoint the directors of all public media outlets such as the state 
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 Strategy papers, 2 :2011 
13
 http://euobserver.com/9/114899 last accessed 14/03/2012 
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television channel.
14
 The new bank law would allow the Hungarian Prime Minister to 
change the deputy governor of the bank, while a change in the retirement age of judges 
would force 274 judges to retire, thus allowing the current government to appoint new 
judges.
15
  
As a result, the EU Commission has started an infringement procedure against Hungary, 
with the threat of suing the Hungarian government under article 7 of the TEU if it did 
not change its constitution.
16
  
The EU reaction to a violation of EU values can be compared to how the EU previously 
handled another case of a possible acquis communautaire violation when the extreme 
right wing Austrian Freedom Party led by Jörg Haider formed a coalition government in 
Austria in 2000 (Meret, 2010: 16). Back in the year 2000, the remaining 14 EU Member 
States upheld a political embargo against Austria (Pelinka 2001: 12). Although the 
European Parliament supported the embargo, then it never became the EU as an 
institution that took action against Austria, it were Member States. 
If the legitimacy indicators from chapter 3.4 are applied to the two case histories of 
Hungary and Austria, then two things indicate that the EU as an institution has gained 
legitimacy in the areas of democracy and rule of law. 
The first indicator is that the EU has taken charge of persecuting Hungary.  
The second indicator is that no coalition of Member State has taken action against 
Hungary independent of the EU. 
This means that not only does the EU now have the confidence to sue a state for 
violating the acquis communautaire on its own initiative, but the EU Member States 
also have confidence that the EU is the best place to settle this dispute. In addition it is 
worth mentioning that with Hungary, it is the first time that the infringement procedure 
has begun in the history of the EU, which signify that the EU as an institution has 
reached a point where a threat similar to the conditionality of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and enlargement negotiations can also be used internally. This 
gives the EU a much needed internal mode of enforcement.    
                                                          
14
 http://euobserver.com/9/114899 last accessed 14/03/2012 
15
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16593827 last assessed 14/03/2012 
16
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16593827 last assessed 14/03/2012 
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The next case is about how the EU has gained a new role as part of the worldwide 
public protest against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).
 17
 ACTA is an 
international trade agreement that focus on protecting the intellectual property of rights 
owners against counterfeiting and copying, be it a physical or digital copy.
18
 ACTA 
protesters have two main points of critique - the content of ACTA and the process by 
which it has been created.
19
 ACTA sceptics argue that the negotiations behind the 
international agreement has been too closed, that it focus too much on the interests of 
big companies, and that the treaty violates the personal privacy and the freedom of 
speech on the internet.
2021
 One of the main issues is a rule that would impose online 
service providers to supply personal information to rights owners. The rule specify that 
if a rights owner request it, then the authorities of a state can impose the service 
providers to deliver personal information on its subscribers to the rights owners.
22 
The widespread concern regarding ACTA has subsequently prompted the EU 
commission to refer the question of whether ACTA violate fundamental rights to the 
ECJ. As mentioned in chapter 7.2 of this thesis, then there has recently been ruled in 
similar cases to the benefit of fundamental rights over intellectual property rights. The 
previous cases did however, not have as much public interest as the ACTA ruling. The 
increased focus on the ACTA ruling means that the political myths of the EU will be 
defined by the outcome of the court case. If ACTA are rejected then the EU can claim 
that fundamental rights are more important to it than the rights of big companies, and 
vice versa. 
Depending on the outcome of the court case then especially an outcome that favors 
fundamental rights would prove the independence of the ECJ from the policy makers of 
the EU, as ACTA has been negotiated by the EU on behalf of the Member States. It 
would however also question the competence and independence of that EU organ that 
                                                          
17
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16999497 accessed 15/03/2012 
18
 http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/acta/ accessed 14/03/2012 
19
 http://www.euo.dk/spsv/off/alle/ACTA/ accessed 15/03/2012 
20
 http://www.euo.dk/spsv/off/alle/ACTA/ accessed 15/03/2012 
21
 http://www.stopacta.info/#Resources accessed 15/03/2012 
22
 http://www.euo.dk/spsv/off/alle/ACTA/ accessed 15/03/2012 
Political Myths, Legitimacy, and Judicial Identity in a European Context 
82 
 
did the actual negotiation, as it did not secure a legal mandate for EU Member States to 
actual join ACTA.  
From a legitimacy point of view, then the referral to the ECJ from the commission does 
mean that the commission considers the ECJ as the most competent organ to decide the 
legality of ACTA, as does the range of nations that has postponed ratification of ACTA 
pending the outcome of the court case. The referral can however also be seen as a way 
for the commission to push the blame for a failed trade agreement to the ECJ or to use a 
ruling as proof that fundamental rights are upheld and critics is uninformed. Regardless 
of the reasons for the commission to refer the question of ACTAs legality to the ECJ, 
then the case establish that the EU is willing to listen and react to public concerns, 
which does help the EU to establish itself as a protector of rights, with the capability 
and legitimacy to defend the public if its rights are in jeopardy. 
 
The final case concerns the current economic crisis in the Eurozone and on what level a 
solution is being negotiated. The economic crisis in the Eurozone has come as an 
aftermath of the subprime mortgage bubble in the USA which escalated into the worst 
global financial crisis in post war time (European Commission, 2009: 8). Some 
Eurozone countries were ill suited for such a downturn in the world economy and 
threatened to severely damage the financial market of the whole Eurozone.
23
  Between 
the Eurozone States, the worst economies were found in Hungary, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain, and Greece, with Greece as the worst case.
24
 So far, Portugal and 
Greece has received enormous crisis help from the rest of the Eurozone countries, as it 
is feared that if the deep banking crisis in Greece spread to Italy and topple the already 
weakened Economy there. The Italian economy is the 3
rd
 largest in the Eurozone and 
the euro will be in serious risk of defaulting if the Italian economy comes to a halt.
25
 So 
far, the EU governed stability and financial pacts has been unable to prevent the 
national deficits in the Eurozone, while national politicians such as the German 
                                                          
23
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13856580 accessed 15/03/2012 
24
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13856580 accessed 15/03/2012 
25
 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/magazine/adam-davidson-european-
finance.html?pagewanted=all accessed 15/03/2012 
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chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy has been highly 
profiled in the media as those who dictate how to solve the crisis.
262728
  
The overall effect is that the political myth of the EU as a strong and stable economy 
has been severely damaged as a result of not living up to its own premise. Before the 
economic crisis there were enough trust in the euro that it were seen as a challenger to 
the American dollar as the world reserve currency (EU Monitor, 2007: 1), while the 
dollar has now begun to rise again in respect to the euro. 
In the case of the euro-economy then the political myth and the legitimacy are highly 
interlinked. The decrease in the strength of the economic myth has come as a direct 
result of the EU not being able to enforce the laws that should govern too high national 
deficits. In other words, the EU did not have the necessary legitimacy to rule on the 
necessary national economic areas, neither directly or indirectly. The continued focus 
on national leaders Merkel and Sarkozy, as the only who can save the euro further 
undermine the EUs legitimacy in the economic area. 
 
8.3 Understanding the Political Cases  
The next step is to look at how the above three cases can constitute a meaning that goes 
beyond a case by case analysis. One thing that can wonder is the seemingly arbitrary 
opportunities that the EU has to prove its political capacity and legitimacy. Without the 
economic crisis, the EU might be the strongest currency in the world. Without a sudden 
awareness of ACTA, EU would not have an opportunity to prove that it put fundamental 
rights ahead of market rights. And, if Hungary had not changed its constitution, the EU 
would not have a chance to prove that it is now ready to handle violations of the acquis 
communautaire at an institutional level instead of at an international level. 
The apparent randomness of EU political issues resembles a theory coined by James 
March and Johan Olsen (1995: 94-95) called the trash-can model. The trashcan model 
describes politics as a stream of solutions, problems, decision-takers, and opportunities 
                                                          
26
 http://nyhederne-dyn.tv2.dk/article.php/id-47915169:kina-lover-merkel-eurokrisehj%C3%A6lp.html 
accessed 15/03/2012 
27
 http://epn.dk/tema/gaeldskrise/article2579553.ece accessed 15/03/2012 
28
 http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Udland/2012/01/26/031232.htm accessed 15/03/2012 
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for taking decisions, where problems and solutions are primarily linked together 
because they exist at the same time (March and Olsen, 1995: 95). Explained in less 
theoretical terms, it means that politicians solve problems with the solutions they 
currently possess.  
Applied to the cases above, then it means that the EU does not currently have the 
capability to solve the Eurozone crisis within the existing confines of the EU 
institutions, and so the politicians solve it the only way they can without abandoning the 
euro altogether, by providing extra funds for the worst economies. Another solution 
would be to instead settle the question of economic deficits in an EU court as a breach 
of the economic stability pact.  
In the cases of Hungary and ACTA the EU has likewise chosen the best viable solution 
at the time, which here is to make it a question of legality. Alternatively, the EU could 
have chosen to do with Hungary like they did with Jörg Haider and do a political 
boycott, while the commission could have waited with referring the legality of the 
ACTA until there was a concrete judicial conflict. Instead the commission selected to 
protect fundamental rights here and now when it is a public matter, rather than later in a 
court case when the protests has cooled down. 
Given these observations, it can be concluded that the ECJ and thereby the EU, indeed 
has gained an increased ability to rule in cases concerning social rights and the rule of 
law, by virtue of being called upon as arbiter in those types of cases (even when it does 
not have competence to rule in them). On the other hand, the economic crisis in the 
Eurozone has become so severe that it cannot be solved by enforcing the stability pacts 
through the justice system, thus essentially side-lining the ECJ during the economic 
crisis in matters concerning the economies of the Eurozone.  
The bottom-line is that any current constellation of political myths in a political entity is 
deciding for which solutions are available for politicians to solve political problems. 
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9 Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis has been to investigate the concept of political myths at a 
regional level, by determining in which way ECJ court rulings constitute a measurable 
effect on political myths, which were followed up by an investigation of the interaction 
between political myths and which solutions the EU use for solving political crisis. 
With the investigation complete, it is time to discuss what the conclusion to the 
investigation is. During the investigation of how court cases constitute the political 
myths, it became apparent that the environmental myth about the EU is not represented 
in the court cases investigated. The reason for this can either be that the environmental 
myth is not in competition with other myths and thus not possible to include in a 
hierarchy, or that court cases wherein the environmental myth is represented fall outside 
the scope of court cases that were selected. 
What could be concluded were however that the economic and social political myths do 
represent contradicting EU values, and that the social rights and equal treatment is 
favoured by the ECJ over economic rights and the free market. Additionally, there is a 
4
th
 myth concerning democracy and the rule of law, which primarily exist in the EU’s 
external policy. It is indecisive whether the 4
th
 myth is a contradiction or continuation of 
respectively the economic or the social myth, as the ECJ do not have the required legal 
basis to rule in those cases. Even though the 4
th
 myth is revisited in the current court 
case against Hungary, then there is still not information to establish the 4
th
 myth in a 
relation of importance to other myths. It is however interesting to see that the EU by its 
very construction override the basic principles of non-interference in the Westphalia 
based UN system. 
It has also become apparent that although political myths do have an impact on the 
legitimacy of the EU, then the interaction between one political myths and legitimacy 
does not automatically call for an action in accordance with the political myth, it merely 
render such an action more possible. 
In connection with this, it is important to understand that although strong political 
myths do provide legitimacy to decisions in the EU, then it is not the only provider of 
legitimacy the EU has. A political myth can be compared to providing a form of 
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charismatic authority to the EU, where people agree with the EU because the EU seems 
to be a leading figure in the field. The legal authority provided by the treaty base 
provides a substantial amount of legitimacy to any EU institution as a principle of 
political stability. 
It is also worth mentioning that although a change in the strength of political myths is 
the outcome of ECJ court cases and the strength of political myths is a factor in 
deciding what is legitimate to do for the EU, then there are no direct relationship 
between rulings in ECJ court cases and the EU’s ability to act out a given policy. 
The link between ECJ rulings and the legitimacy do however follow a logical 
argumentation. Strong political myths create more legitimacy for the EU to operate in 
the political area of those myths, and the ECJ can strengthen political myths through the 
rulings that the ECJ make. This does not make a stringent cause-effect relationship, 
where A automatically leads to C, instead we see an argumentation where A leads to B, 
which help enabling B to lead to C, without necessarily doing so. In the context of this 
thesis, meaning that when the ECJ confirm the political will to enforce social rights in 
the EU, then it does not automatically mean that the EU demand social rights as part of 
an international agreement, but it do help enable the EU to demand it. 
 
The question now is: What can these findings be used for?  
 
The answer is that the knowledge, of which direction the EU is steering, provides a 
better foundation for discussing why we need the EU. Regardless of whether you are for 
or against the EU, then any political debate would benefit from knowing what is 
actually going on. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Table 6.1 – Overview of Value Articles 
Treaty TITLE and Article Value(s) or principles Political Myth(s) 
TEU TITLE I Article 1 Democracy and good governance Nil 
TEU TITLE I Article 2 Respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of 
persons belonging to minorities, 
pluralism,  non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, and equality 
between women and men and 
solidarity 
Social 
TEU TITLE I Article 3 Free movement of persons,  
eradication of poverty,  protection 
of human rights,  the internal 
market, the economic and monetary 
union and the promotion of free and 
fair trade in the wider world,  a high 
level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the 
environment and sustainable 
development of the Earth 
Social, Economic and 
environmental 
TEU TITLE I Article 4 Nil Nil 
TEU TITLE I Article 5 Subsidiarity and proportionality Nil 
TEU TITLE I Article 6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union and the 
European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
Social 
TEU TITLE I Article 7 Nil Nil (Social) 
TEU TITLE I Article 8 Nil (Promoting EU values) Nil 
TEU TITLE II Article 9 Nil Nil 
TEU TITLE II Article 10 Representative democracy Nil 
TEU TITLE II Article 11 Political voice to the people Social 
TEU TITLE II Article 12 Good governance Nil 
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TFEU TITLE II Article 7 Consistency between policies and 
activities 
Nil 
TFEU TITLE II Article 8 promotion of equalit Social 
TFEU TITLE II Article 9 High levels of employment in the 
implementation of its activities and 
policies, social protection, 
protection of human health and to 
fight against social exclusion 
Economic and social 
TFEU TITLE II Article 10 combat a wide variety of 
discrimination 
Social 
TFEU TITLE II Article 11 Environmental protection 
requirements, with an emphasis on 
sustainable development 
Environmental 
TFEU TITLE II Article 12 Consumer protection Social 
TFEU TITLE II Article 13 Prerogatives for cultural and 
religious communities 
Social 
TFEU TITLE II Article 14 Ensure economic services Economic 
TFEU TITLE II Article 15 Good governance and democracy Nil 
TFEU TITLE II Article 16 Protection of personal data Social 
TFEU TITLE II Article 17 Recognition of religions and 
philosophical communities 
Nil 
TFEU TITLE II Article 18 Equal treatment based on 
nationality 
Social 
TFEU Part Two Article 19 combating discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation 
Social 
TFEU Part Two Article 20 Citizenship Nil 
TFEU Part Two Article 21 Political rights derived from 
citizenship 
Nil 
TFEU Part Two Article 22 Political rights derived from 
citizenship 
Nil 
TFEU Part Two Article 23 Political rights derived from 
citizenship 
Nil 
TFEU Part Two Article 24 Political rights derived from 
citizenship 
Nil 
TFEU Part Two Article 25 Nil Nil 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Table 6.2 Court Cases 
Treaty base 
reference 
Cases No. 
of 
cases 
TEU TITLE I 
Article 2 
C-66/11 P(R) – Uspaskicch v Parliament. C-282/10 – Dominguez, C-
163/10 – Patriciello, C548/09 P – Bank Melli Iran v Council, C-236/09 – 
Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Other, C-106/09 P 
– Commision and Spain v Goverment of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, 
C-57/09 – B and D, C-34/09 – Ruiz Zambrano, C-570/98 – Symvoulio 
Apochetefeseos Lefkosias. 
9 
TEU TITLE I 
Article 3 
C-366/10 - The Air Transport Association of America and Others, C-282/10 – 
Dominguez, C-496/09 - Commission v Italy, C-391/09 - Runevič-Vardyn and 
Wardyn, C-356/09 – Kleist, C-236/09 - Association Belge des Consommateurs 
Test-Achats and Others, C-145/09 – Tsakouridis, C-137/09 – Josemans, C-57/09 - 
B and D, C-52/09 - TeliaSonera Sverige, C-34/09 - Ruiz Zambrano, C-515/08 - dos 
Santos Palhota and Others, C-346/08 - Commission v United Kingdom.        
13 
TEU TITLE I 
Article 6 
C-484/11 – Budan, C-483/11 - Boncea and Others, C-432/11 - Cartiaux Service 
Plus, C-161/11 – Vino, C-52/11 P - Victoria Sánchez v Parliament and 
Commission, C-622/10 – Paquot, C-538/10 - Lebrun and Howet, C-538/10 - 
Lebrun and Howet, C-491/10 PPU - Aguirre Zarraga, C-411/10 - N. S., C-400/10 
PPU – MCB., C-339/10 - Asparuhov Estov and Others, C-314/10 – Pagnoul, C-
282/10 – Dominguez, C-267/10 - Rossius and Collard, C-214/10 – KHS, C-188/10 
- Melki and Abdeli, C-155/10 - Williams and Others, C-143/10 P - Uznański v 
Poland, C-110/10 P - Solvay v Commission, C-109/10 P - Solvay v Commission, C-
108/10 – Scattolon, C-70/10 - Scarlet Extended, C-69/10 - Samba Diouf, C-21/10 
– Nagy, C-521/09 P - Elf Aquitaine v Commission, C-401/09 P - Evropaïki 
Dynamiki v ECB, C-372/09 - Peñarroja Fa, C-316/09 - MSD Sharp & Dohme, C-
279/09 – DEB, C-261/09 – Mantello, C-243/09 – Fuß, C-236/09 - Association 
Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others, C-92/09 - Volker und Markus 
Schecke and Eifert, C-57/09 - B and D, C-34/09 - Ruiz Zambrano, C-271/08 - 
Commission v Germany, C-147/08 – Römer, C-550/07 P - Akzo Nobel Chemicals 
and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, C-465/07 – Elgafaji. 
39 
TEU TITLE I 
Article 7 
C-282/10 – Dominguez, C-143/10 P - Uznański v Poland. 
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TEU TITLE II 
Article 11 
None 0 
TFEU TITLE II 
Article 8 
C-236/09 - Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and Others  
 
1 
TFEU TITLE II 
Article 9 
C-282/10 – Dominguez, C-515/08 - dos Santos Palhota and Others. 
 
2 
TFEU TITLE II 
Article 10 
C-356/09 - Kleist, C-236/09 - Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats 
and Others.  
 
2 
TFEU TITLE II 
Article 11 
C-518/08 - Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí and VEGAP  
 
1 
TFEU TITLE II 
Article 12 
C-240/10 - Schulz-Delzers and Schulz  
 
1 
TFEU TITLE II 
Article 13 
None 0 
TFEU TITLE II 
Article 14 
None 0 
TFEU TITLE II 
Article 16 
None 0 
TFEU TITLE II 
Article 18 
C-282/10 – Dominguez, C-240/10 - Schulz-Delzers and Schulz, C-25/10 - 
Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach, C-450/09 – Schröder, C-399/09 – Landtová,  
C-391/09 - Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn, C-384/09 - Prunus and Polonium,C-
291/09 - Francesco Guarnieri & Cie, C-196/09 - Miles and Others, C-137/09 – 
Josemans, C-34/09 - Ruiz Zambrano, C-403/08 - Football Association Premier 
League and Others, C-73/08 - Bressol and Others. 
13 
TFEU Part Two 
Article 19 
C-310/10 - Agafiţei and Others, C-123/10 – Brachner, C-447/09 - Prigge and 
Others, C-236/09 - Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats and 
Others, C-550/07 P - Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission. 
5 
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Appendix C 
Typology of Court Cases 
For space issues there is a typology key referring to characteristics of each court case: 
1 If there is a reference in the argumentation to the purpose of the EU, including 
references to Articles that establish the principles of the EU 
2 If there is a reference to the original will of an article 
3 If there is a reference to laws that are common for Member States or to the case law of 
the EU 
4 If the Court Case leads to the overruling of a regulation or directive 
5 If there is a references to a 3
rd
 party as a general principles of European law 
6 Favours Economic myth 
7 Favours Social myth 
8 Favours Environmental myth 
9 Economic myth overruled 
10 Social myth overruled 
11 Environmental myth overruled 
12 Ruling dismissed or removed from the register for technical reasons or due to inad-
missibility 
 
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 Notes 
C-483/11 - Boncea 
and Others 
         x  x dismissal on grounds of inadmissibility 
(Joined case with the one below) 
C-484/11 – Budan          x  x Call for the ECJ to rule on human rights  
C-432/11 - Car-
tiaux Service Plus 
           x The request for preliminary ruling was re-
called by the applicant 
C-161/11 – Vino      x     x  x Question on general principle of equality 
C-66/11 P(R) – 
Uspaskicch v Par-
liament 
           x Applicant withdrew case 
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Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 Notes 
C-52/11 P - Victo-
ria Sánchez v Par-
liament and Com-
mission 
    x     x  x The court dismissed an appeal to rule in a 
case of alleged corruption in the Spanish 
government 
C-622/10 – Paquot           x  x Call for ruling on fundamental rights 
C-538/10 - Lebrun 
and Howet  
x  x  x     x  x Call for ruling on fundamental rights 
C-491/10 PPU - 
Aguirre Zarraga 
  x  x  x      Abducted children by divorced parents 
against court recognition between Member 
States 
C-411/10 - N. S.   x    x      Rule of law and rights of Asylum seekers  
C-400/10 PPU – 
MCB. 
    x        Rights of unmarried fathers, against auto-
matic right of child and free movement of 
the mother. 
C-339/10 - Aspa-
ruhov Estov and 
Others  
x    x     x  x A call for fair trials in recognising previous 
plans for commercial city planning over 
new municipal plans for green areas 
C-366/10 - The Air 
Transport Associa-
tion of America and 
Others 
  x  x   x x    EU regulations against Public International 
law. Duty and taxes on fuel for internation-
al flights versus the Kyoto Protocol. 
C-314/10 – Pagn-
oul  
x  x       x  x The ECJ called for as an Ombudsman for 
guaranteeing proper rule of law as a right to 
EU citizens through the ECHR  
C-310/10 - Agafiţei 
and Others 
           x Unclear reference for preliminary ruling 
C-282/10 – 
Dominguez 
  x    x  x    EU labour rules has precedent over national 
rules, and only be changed to the benefit of 
the labourer, not the employer. 
C-267/10 - Rossius 
and Collard  
  x    x  x   x Human health against extra duty on tobac-
co. Despite ruling to have no jurisdiction in 
preliminary ruling, the court states that ex-
tra duty on tobacco is correct in the EU. 
C-240/10 - Schulz-
Delzers and Schulz 
  x          Discrimination of nationality based on tax 
reducing purchasing power in another coun-
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try. 
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 Notes 
C-214/10 – KHS    x  x  x  x    You accumulate paid leave, even if you are 
too sick to take the leave. 
C-188/10 - Melki 
and Abdeli  
  x    x      It is against the Schengen to have a zone of 
identity control similar to a border control. 
C-163/10 – Patrici-
ello,  
            Political immunity by members of Parlia-
ment is only active in conjunction with exe-
cution of political duties.  
C-155/10 - Wil-
liams and Others  
  x  x  x      Annual holiday pay is still guaranteed by 
EU law if the worker has varying remunera-
tion. 
C-143/10 P - 
Uznański v Poland  
           x The ECJ as high court in right of inher-
itance against the Polish state 
C-123/10 – Brach-
ner  
      x  x    Equal treatment of men and woman in pen-
sion schemes, unaffected by statistical age 
or time in job. 
C-110/10 P - Sol-
vay v Commission  
  x          Negligence of rule of law (22 years for a 
judgement) by the commission 
C-109/10 P - Sol-
vay v Commission 
  x      x    Rule of law countermand a fine based on 
abusing dominant market position  
C-108/10 – Scatto-
lon  
  x    x      Rights of staff in mergers and transfers of 
public authority , salary based on length of 
service.  
C-70/10 - Scarlet 
Extended  
  x  x  x  x    Fundamental rights of the users of an ISP 
versus protection of intellectual property 
C-69/10 - Samba 
Diouf  
x  x          It is allowed to have additional rules for 
how refugee status is decided than those 
supplied by the EU. 
C-25/10 - Mission-
swerk Werner 
Heukelbach 
  x   x       Same reduction in succession duties, re-
gardless of Member State, if criteria are the 
same. 
C-21/10 – Nagy  x x  x        Agri-environmental aid is decided by the 
national state.  
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 Notes 
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C-548/09 P – Bank 
Melli Iran v Coun-
cil 
x x x  x        Melli lost its appeal for not freezing assets 
that are part of Iranian Nuclear programme 
C-521/09 P - Elf 
Aquitaine v Com-
mission  
  x      x    A previous decision to fine a company for 
being part of a cartel were overturned on 
the grounds of missing evidence. 
C-496/09 - Com-
mission v Italy 
            Court order to fine Italy for not complying 
with an earlier judgement  
C-447/09 - Prigge 
and Others  
 x x  x  x      Pilots cannot have an earlier age of forced 
retirement than workers in other jobs. 
C-450/09 – Schrö-
der  
  x  x  x      Immovable grounds for tax deduction also 
applies to non residents. 
C-401/09 P - 
Evropaïki Dy-
namiki v ECB  
    x       x An appeal to reconsider a previous inad-
missible appeal were considered inadmissi-
ble for not being clear. 
C-399/09 – 
Landtová 
  x    x      Discrimination based on nationality against 
denying payment of extra pension. 
C-391/09 - Rune-
vič-Vardyn and 
Wardyn 
    x        Discrimination laws does not preclude a 
state from requiring names to be written in 
official national languages. 
C-384/09 - Prunus 
and Polonium 
x x x  x x       It is allowed for member states to make tax 
exemptions for companies in 3
rd
 countries 
to be dependent on administrative assis-
tance to combat tax evasion. 
C-372/09 - Peñar-
roja Fa  
  x          A court expert in one Member State is so 
qualified in all Member States 
C-356/09 – Kleist x  x    x      Combating discrimination based on nation-
al age of pension and sex. 
C-316/09 - MSD 
Sharp & Dohme  
x  x  x  x      Differentiation between advertisement and 
information on the internet. 
C-291/09 - Fran-
cesco Guarnieri & 
Cie  
  x       x   3
rd
 country nationals can be imposed with 
cautio judicatum solvi if his claim for pay-
ment of goods go to court 
C-279/09 – DEB  x x x  x        It is up to the national state to grant legal 
aid to legal persons, and not just natural 
persons 
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Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 Notes 
C-261/09 – Mantel-
lo 
x x   x  x      The principle of ne bis in idem in the Euro-
pean arrest warrant constitutes an autono-
mous concept of European Union law  
C-243/09 – Fuß        x      Complaints about average weekly work 
time cannot be used as reason to force a 
worker to a transfer to another type of job 
C-236/09 – Associ-
ation Belge des 
Consommateurs 
Test-Achats and 
Other 
x x x x x  x      A clause that could allow retirement 
schemes to consider a persons sex as 
grounds for size of premiums has been de-
cided to be discriminatory and therefore 
void. 
C-196/09 - Miles 
and Others  
x  x          Complaints Board of the European Schools 
has no jurisdiction to ask the ECJ for pre-
liminary rulings 
C-145/09 – Tsa-
kouridis 
x x   x     x   It is up to the national court to decide if a 
crime is considered imperative grounds of 
public security when considering expulsion 
of national citizens 
C-137/09 – Jose-
mans 
 x x  x  x  x    It is allowed to impose discrimination to 
non-residents in order to combat drug tour-
ism in Netherlander coffee shops 
C-106/09 P – 
Commision and 
Spain v Goverment 
of Gibraltar and 
United Kingdom 
x x x   x       Gibraltar cannot be used as a low tax region 
for British companies 
C-92/09 - Volker 
und Markus 
Schecke and Eifert 
x x x    x      The protection of personal information 
weights heavier than a call for more trans-
parency in who receive agricultural aid 
C-57/09 – B and D   x  x  x      Being affiliated with a terrorist organisation 
does not constitute reason in itself for not 
granting asylum to an individual 
C-52/09 - Teli-
aSonera Sverige 
 x x   x       Abuse of dominant position to squeeze 
prices on retail broadband connections 
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 Notes 
C-34/09 – Ruiz   x  x  x      The third country dependant parent of mi-
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Zambrano nor children, who are European Union citi-
zens, has automatic work permit and right 
of residence  
C-518/08 - Funda-
ción Gala-Salvador 
Dalí and VEGAP  
  x  x        Law of succession and resale rights of non- 
bequeath heirs 
C-515/08 - dos 
Santos Palhota and 
Others 
  x  x  x      Employers are not required to notify social 
authorities of posting non-national workers 
C-403/08 - Football 
Association Prem-
ier League and 
Others  
 x x  x x       Satellite decoders cannot only be lawfully 
used and sold in a part of the EU. If its le-
gal to sell in one Member State it is so in 
all. 
C-346/08 - Com-
mission v United 
Kingdom 
x x x          The use of electricity to produce aluminium 
does not constitute a direct use of products 
of combustion in a manufacturing process  
 
C-271/08 - Com-
mission v Germany 
x x x   x    x   A pension scheme that is part of a collec-
tive bargaining is forced to put out to tender 
C-147/08 – Römer x x x    x      The pension rights of registered partners 
C-73/08 - Bressol 
and Others 
 x x   x x      It is not allowed to have quotas for the 
number of foreign students at higher educa-
tion. 
C-550/07 P - Akzo 
Nobel Chemicals 
and Akcros Chemi-
cals v Commission 
  x  x        Internal company or group communications 
with enrolled in-house lawyers are not cov-
ered by legal professional privilege  
 
C-465/07 – Elgafaji   x  x  x      A refugee can claim risk of serious harm 
even though there are no evidence that the 
refugee is personally targeted for harm 
 
 
 
